Addis Abeba – This article provides a comprehensive rebuttal to Hassan Yusuf’s opinion piece, “Ethiopia’s Maritime Dilemma: Why MoU with Somaliland Risks Diplomatic Fallout, Undermines Regional Stability,” which critiques the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Yusuf argues that the MoU violates Somalia’s sovereignty, isolates Ethiopia diplomatically, destabilizes the region, and is economically unfeasible. However, this rebuttal contends that Yusuf’s claims are based on a misinterpretation of international law, a disregard for historical legal continuity, and an underestimation of Ethiopia’s strategic imperatives.

By engaging with international legal principles, historical precedents, and geopolitical realities, this article demonstrates that the MoU is legally sound, strategically essential, and aligned with established diplomatic practices. The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU is not only justified under international law but also represents a pragmatic approach to addressing Ethiopia’s maritime access challenges while promoting regional stability and economic integration.

Hassan Yusuf’s opinion piece critiques the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU and serves as a rebuttal to an earlier article by Adam Daud Ahmed, “Ethiopia’s Maritime Gamble: Seize Opportunity with Somaliland’s Offer or Yield to Somalia’s Pressure?”  Yusuf argues that the MoU violates Somalia’s sovereignty, isolates Ethiopia diplomatically, destabilizes the region, and is economically unfeasible. However, his claims appear to be grounded in a contested interpretation of international law, a disregard for historical legal continuity, and an underestimation of Ethiopia’s strategic imperatives.

This rebuttal systematically addresses Yusuf’s arguments by engaging with international legal principles, historical precedents, and geopolitical realities. It contends that the MoU is not only legally sound but also strategically essential for Ethiopia and aligned with established diplomatic practices. Through a structured and evidence-based analysis, this response provides a comprehensive and academically rigorous counterpoint to Yusuf’s assertions, while also contextualizing the debate within the broader discourse initiated by Ahmed’s original piece.

Ethiopia’s Right to Maritime Access

Yusuf asserts that Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions must be grounded in international law and diplomatic engagement, not unilateral agreements that could provoke regional instability and diplomatic backlash. However, this assertion misrepresents the nature of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU, which is unequivocally a bilateral agreement entered into voluntarily by two entities—Ethiopia and Somaliland—both of which possess the capacity to engage in binding negotiations. The characterization of Ethiopia’s actions as unilateral misrepresents the nature of the agreement, as unilateralism, by definition, refers to actions undertaken without the engagement or consent of other relevant parties. In contrast, the MoU is the product of deliberate and mutual negotiations, thus falling squarely within the framework of lawful international agreements.

The MoU derives legitimacy from established principles of international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which codifies the rights of landlocked states, including Ethiopia, to secure access to maritime routes for trade and economic purposes, as articulated in Article 125. The treaty explicitly mandates that landlocked states have the right to negotiate access to the sea, a provision that Ethiopia has lawfully exercised in this instance. Furthermore, the principles of customary international law affirm the right of sovereign entities to engage in diplomatic negotiations to secure maritime access through peaceful and cooperative means, reinforcing the legality of Ethiopia’s engagement with Somaliland.

Additionally, Ethiopia’s negotiations with Somaliland align with state practice and established international legal precedents. Numerous historical examples exist where entities lacking universal recognition have entered into legally binding agreements concerning trade, security, and diplomatic cooperation. The MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, therefore, is neither anomalous nor a violation of established legal norms but rather a reflection of contemporary diplomatic realities. Yusuf’s contention that Ethiopia’s actions undermine international law disregards the well-founded legal basis of the agreement and fails to acknowledge the distinction between de jure recognition and de facto statehood. Given that Somaliland has exercised effective control over its territory for over three decades, its capacity to enter into agreements is consistent with both legal doctrine and historical precedent.

Ultimately, Yusuf’s portrayal of the MoU as an illegitimate and unilateral arrangement is devoid of factual and legal merit. Ethiopia’s approach is firmly rooted in international law, diplomatic custom, and economic pragmatism, making the agreement both legally defensible and strategically indispensable.

Somaliland’s Lack of Recognition, Sovereignty

Yusuf argues that no country in the world—including Ethiopia—officially recognizes Somaliland as an independent state, and therefore, any agreement concerning maritime access must involve the Federal Government of Somalia, which holds internationally recognized sovereignty over Somaliland’s territory. However, this argument reflects a misunderstanding of international law and historical continuity. While it is true that Somaliland lacks formal international recognition, it has exercised de facto sovereignty since 1991, maintaining independent governance, security, and legal institutions. Somaliland meets the criteria for statehood under the Montevideo Convention (1933), which requires a permanent population, defined territory, functioning government, and capacity to engage in international relations.

Moreover, the principle of uti possidetis juris, which upholds colonial borders upon independence, supports Somaliland’s claim to its pre-1960 borders. When British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland united in 1960, the union was not formalized through a legally binding treaty. Somaliland’s withdrawal from the union in 1991 can thus be seen as a restoration of its pre-1960 sovereignty, not an act of secession. This principle has been upheld in international law, as seen in cases like Eritrea’s independence and South Sudan’s secession.

Yusuf’s claim that Ethiopia is bypassing Somalia by engaging with Somaliland ignores the reality that Somaliland has functioned as an independent entity for over three decades. Ethiopia’s engagement with Somaliland is not a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty but a recognition of the de facto political realities on the ground. 

Ethiopia’s Diplomatic Credibility, Precedent for Separatism

Yusuf contends that by bypassing Somalia and signing an agreement with an unrecognized entity, Ethiopia risks undermining its own diplomatic credibility and setting a precedent that could be used against its own territorial integrity in the future. However, this concern is unfounded. Somaliland is not a secessionist movement but a case of state restoration, reclaiming its sovereignty after the dissolution of a voluntary political union with Somalia. This is fundamentally different from separatist movements that seek to alter existing state borders. Ethiopia’s engagement with Somaliland is consistent with international legal principles and historical precedents.”

Ethiopia’s engagement with Somaliland is consistent with international legal principles and historical precedents. For example, Kosovo and Taiwan have entered into international agreements despite lacking universal recognition, demonstrating that functional sovereignty can override formal recognition barriers. The MoU does not undermine Ethiopia’s territorial integrity but rather reflects a pragmatic approach to regional diplomacy.

Somalia’s Sovereignty, Ethiopia’s Legal Obligations

Yusuf emphasizes that Somalia is a recognized UN member state, and its territorial sovereignty is upheld by the African Union, the Arab League, and the United Nations. He argues that just as Ethiopia defends its borders against external interference, Somalia has the same legal right to oppose agreements that threaten its territorial unity. While Somalia’s sovereignty is recognized under international law, Yusuf overlooks the de facto reality of Somaliland’s functional independence. Somalia has not exercised effective control over Somaliland since 1991, and Somaliland has maintained its own government, security, and legal institutions. The MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland is a bilateral agreement that does not infringe on Somalia’s sovereignty but rather reflects the political realities on the ground.

Furthermore, Ethiopia’s right to maritime access is enshrined in UNCLOS Article 125, which grants landlocked states the right to negotiate maritime access through cooperative agreements. The MoU aligns with this principle, ensuring that Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations are pursued through lawful and diplomatic means. Somalia’s objections, while politically significant, do not invalidate the legal basis of the MoU.

Economic, Logistical Realities

Yusuf critiques the economic feasibility of the MoU, arguing that switching to Somaliland would require billions in investment to build new port infrastructure, trade corridors, and logistical networks—a process that could take decades. He dismisses the idea that Somaliland could immediately replace Djibouti’s strategic importance as wishful thinking. However, this critique is speculative and short-sighted. While it is true that developing Somaliland’s infrastructure will require significant investment, the long-term strategic benefits of diversifying Ethiopia’s maritime access outweigh the initial costs. Ethiopia currently relies on Djibouti for over 95% of its trade, making it vulnerable to geopolitical tensions and economic disruptions. The MoU does not seek to replace Djibouti but to create an additional trade route that enhances Ethiopia’s economic resilience.

Historical precedents, such as South Sudan’s agreements with Kenya and Sudan, demonstrate that investments in alternative maritime routes can yield significant long-term economic benefits. Yusuf’s dismissal of the MoU’s economic potential reflects a lack of understanding of Ethiopia’s strategic imperatives and the importance of diversifying trade routes.

Geopolitical Implications, Regional Stability

Yusuf highlights opposition from regional actors, including Somalia, Turkey, Egypt, and the Gulf States, arguing that the MoU risks increasing Ethiopia’s diplomatic isolation. However, diplomatic friction is a common feature of international relations and does not inherently invalidate the legality or legitimacy of an agreement. The MoU is grounded in Ethiopia’s legal rights under UNCLOS and customary international law, which remain valid irrespective of the positions of individual states.

Moreover, Ethiopia’s diplomatic weight and experience in regional engagement position it to navigate any challenges that may arise. Diplomatic disagreements are typically resolved through dialogue, mediation, or legal arbitration, and there is no reason to assume that the MoU will lead to prolonged conflict or instability. The opposition of certain states reflects their national interests rather than a fundamental flaw in the agreement itself.

Yusuf’s assertion that Ethiopia’s MoU with Somaliland has triggered diplomatic pushback from Somalia and its allies, including Turkey, Egypt, and the Gulf States, is accurate in describing the political reactions but flawed in its legal implications. Diplomatic opposition from regional actors does not equate to a violation of international law. Diplomatic friction is an inherent feature of international relations, often driven by national interests rather than adherence to legal principles. The objections raised by Turkey, Egypt, and others stem from their strategic considerations, not from a legitimate legal challenge to Ethiopia’s right to secure maritime access.

Historically, international law has recognized that bilateral agreements negotiated between consenting entities remain valid regardless of third-party objections. Disputes of this nature are typically resolved through diplomatic dialogue, mediation, or legal arbitration, not by dismissing a legally sound agreement. Ethiopia, as a dominant regional actor with extensive diplomatic experience, is fully capable of managing such challenges within established international frameworks. Ethiopia’s diplomatic weight and experience in regional engagement position it to navigate any challenges that may arise.” 

Furthermore, diplomatic objections from specific states do not invalidate Ethiopia’s rights under international law. The MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland aligns with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and customary international law, affirming Ethiopia’s legal claim to negotiate maritime access. The principle of state sovereignty and mutual consent in treaty law dictates that as long as Ethiopia and Somaliland have agreed to the MoU, external opposition holds no legal weight. Ethiopia’s rights under UNCLOS Article 125, which guarantees landlocked states access to maritime trade through cooperative agreements, remain unaffected by diplomatic disagreements.

Regional Stability: A Misguided Concern

Yusuf’s claim that the MoU could provoke regional instability lacks empirical evidence. Historically, structured agreements facilitating lawful access to maritime trade routes have been instruments of regional stability rather than disruption. Economic deprivation and trade restrictions have been well-documented sources of conflict, while bilateral agreements such as the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU reduce economic vulnerabilities and enhance stability.

By formalizing Ethiopia’s access to the sea through Somaliland, the MoU establishes a legal and predictable framework for maritime trade, thereby strengthening regional economic integration. Ethiopia’s over-reliance on Djibouti as its sole maritime gateway poses a strategic risk. The MoU mitigates this risk by creating an alternative route, ensuring trade continuity, and fostering economic resilience.

Yusuf’s claim that the MoU threatens regional stability is speculative and unsupported by factual analysis. On the contrary, denying Ethiopia a structured, legal avenue for maritime access may force it to pursue alternative measures that could introduce unnecessary geopolitical tensions. History has demonstrated that economic exclusion has been a driving force behind instability, whereas agreements like the MoU serve as mechanisms for economic cooperation and regional security.

Yusuf’s assertion that Ethiopia’s decision to sign an MoU with Somaliland has triggered diplomatic pushback from Somalia and its allies, including Turkey, Egypt, and the Gulf States, is accurate in describing the political reactions but flawed in its legal implications. While Yusuf highlights opposition from certain regional actors, diplomatic disagreements are not a measure of an agreement’s legality or legitimacy. The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU is rooted in international law, particularly UNCLOS and the principles of sovereign agreements, and remains valid regardless of external objections.

Ethiopia’s extensive diplomatic experience and influence in the Horn of Africa enable it to effectively navigate such geopolitical challenges. Disagreements of this nature are standard in international diplomacy and are typically addressed through negotiation and diplomatic mediation, rather than outright rejection of legally binding agreements. The opposition from Turkey, Egypt, and Somalia is politically motivated and does not undermine the MoU’s legal standing or strategic importance.

Furthermore, Ethiopia’s decision to diversify its maritime access is a calculated and necessary move to secure its long-term economic interests. While certain states may view the agreement through the lens of their own strategic agendas, Ethiopia’s sovereign right to engage in legally sound negotiations with Somaliland remains indisputable. The MoU is not an act of provocation but rather a pragmatic decision based on economic necessity and legal legitimacy.

Regional Influence

Yusuf suggests that Turkey’s security partnership with Somalia could escalate tensions. However, Turkey’s military assistance to Somalia is part of a broader security arrangement, not a response to the MoU. The claim that Turkey will increase its military presence in Mogadishu due to the MoU is speculative and ignores Turkey’s broader strategic interests, including economic partnerships with Ethiopia.

Yusuf argues that Egypt could leverage the MoU to deepen ties with Somalia against Ethiopia, particularly in the context of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute. However, Ethiopia’s maritime strategy is separate from the GERD negotiations. Egypt’s diplomatic alignment with Somalia predates the MoU, making its response part of a broader regional rivalry rather than a direct reaction to Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations.

The Arab League’s recognition of Somalia’s sovereignty does not negate Somaliland’s de facto status or Ethiopia’s rights under UNCLOS. Many international agreements involve de facto authorities despite a lack of formal recognition. The Arab League’s stance remains a political position, not a legally binding determinant of Ethiopia’s ability to negotiate maritime agreements.

Contrary to Yusuf’s claim that the MoU isolates Ethiopia, it actually enhances Ethiopia’s geopolitical leverage by diversifying trade routes and economic partners. Ethiopia remains a dominant regional power with strategic alliances that extend beyond Somalia’s sphere of influence. Long-term stability in the Horn of Africa is best achieved through structured agreements rather than dependency on a single maritime route.

Yusuf’s claim that Ethiopia’s desire for maritime access is legitimate and understandable but must be pursued through internationally recognized legal frameworks and diplomatic engagement is already being adhered to. UNCLOS Article 125 explicitly grants landlocked states the right to access the sea through cooperative agreements. The MoU follows this principle, reinforcing Ethiopia’s legal maritime aspirations.

The MoU is a bilateral agreement, a well-established legal mechanism under international law. Historical precedents, such as Switzerland’s access to European ports and South Sudan’s trade corridors, illustrate that landlocked states regularly engage in similar agreements without facing claims of illegality.

Yusuf’s argument that Ethiopia should engage Somalia rather than Somaliland ignores Somalia’s lack of effective governance over Somaliland. The Federal Government of Somalia has not exercised authority over Somaliland for over three decades, rendering direct negotiations with Mogadishu impractical.

Ethiopia’s strategy respects regional stability by negotiating with the entity that exercises actual control over the territory in question—Somaliland—rather than engaging a government that lacks jurisdiction over the region.

Conclusion

The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU is a legally sound, diplomatically prudent, and economically necessary agreement that aligns with international legal frameworks and historical precedents. Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access through the MoU is not only justified but also essential for its long-term economic and strategic interests. Rather than undermining regional stability, the MoU represents a step toward greater economic integration and cooperation in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s approach is not a deviation from international norms but a reaffirmation of its commitment to securing its maritime rights through lawful means.  

By Gulaid Yusuf Idaan, AS