Image Source: Kevin Dietsch/via Getty Images 

On 27 June 2025, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed a peace agreement in Washington, D.C., ending a decades-long conflict. The deal comes after DRC President Félix Tshisekedi proposed granting the US access to the country’s mineral resources in exchange for security support. As its competition with China intensifies, control over strategic supply chains is a growing priority for the United States (US). Similar to the Ukraine-United States Mineral Resources Agreement, this deal links resource access with political stabilisation.

The DRC has vast reserves of minerals worth US$ 24 trillion, including critical minerals essential for global clean energy and technology supply chains. However, American firms have been hesitant to invest in the country due to political instability and security threats. The US is trying to exchange security for minerals cooperation to offset China’s dominance in the region. But American interventions and hopes for lasting peace must be understood within the context of the complex interplay of armed groups, cross-border dynamics, and control over natural resources that have fuelled this conflict for 30 years.

Background of the Conflict

The conflict traces its roots to the end of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 when Hutu extremists fled to the DRC and continued their attacks on Rwanda’s Tutsis. The Rwandan response led to the First and Second Congo Wars, during which the DRC accused Rwanda of targeting Hutu civilians and looting Congo’s resources. Neighbouring countries took sides in the conflict, and the Great Lakes region has been mired in ongoing strife since then, which the United Nations has called “one of the most protracted, complex, serious humanitarian crises on Earth.” The conflict has claimed over 6 million lives and left millions more in poverty despite the region’s immense mineral wealth.

The deal comes after DRC President Félix Tshisekedi proposed granting the US access to the country’s mineral resources in exchange for security support.Over 100 armed groups are active in the DRC today, mainly in the mineral-rich eastern provinces. These groups control mining sites through extortion, forced labour, child labour, and protection rackets, using illicit mineral trade to fund their militant activities.

One of these groups is M23, which emerged in 2012, citing the government's failure to implement a 2009 peace deal and protect Congolese Tutsis. It was temporarily defeated by the Congolese government in 2013 but reemerged in 2022. In January and February 2025, the group managed to seize control of the capitals of North Kivu and South Kivu provinces in an effort to march on the national capital of Kinshasa. According to a 2023 UN Group of Experts report, Rwanda has provided direct military support to M23, including troops and weapons.

Rwanda denies any involvement and insists that its troops deployed in the DRC act in self-defence against Congolese forces and Hutu militia. The DRC, in turn, supports rebel groups like the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), formed by remnants of the Hutu militias after 1994. Kinshasa views the M23 as a front for Rwanda’s larger territorial and resource ambitions, and has backed the FDLR as a counterweight. Rwanda denies any involvement and insists that its troops deployed in the DRC act in self-defence against Congolese forces and Hutu militia.

The DRC has estimated that it is losing US$1 billion worth of minerals annually in illegal trade facilitated by the war. Analyses of the conflict have found that Rwanda and Uganda are the primary beneficiaries of the illicit trade in smuggled Congolese minerals. The two countries have emerged as major exporters of minerals such as gold and coltan, despite having limited reserves.

Previous peace efforts have failed to end the violence, including African Union-led mediation attempts such as the Luanda Peace Process and the Nairobi Peace Process. In February, the US imposed sanctions on senior officials within the Rwandan military, while the European Parliament called for the suspension of a minerals cooperation agreement and a freeze on aid to Rwanda to pressure it into ceasing its support for M23. These developments signal the nature of Western engagement in the region, where mineral security is increasingly intertwined with broader diplomatic and security objectives.

American Interests in the Region

The US aims to gain access to the DRC’s minerals, such as tantalum, gold, cobalt, copper, and lithium, which it needs to meet technology demands and reduce its dependence on China. The DRC holds large and high-grade reserves of these minerals, including 60 percent of global coltan reserves that produce tantalum. It is also the world's largest producer of cobalt, accounting for approximately 76 percent of global cobalt mine production in 2024. Currently, the DRC’s mining sector is dominated by Chinese companies, particularly in the production of cobalt. Chinese companies control and refine 80 percent of the cobalt output from the DRC. China’s growing control over the DRC’s minerals reflects its broader investment strategies across the continent.

For Washington, fostering supply chain resilience will involve countering China’s influence in Africa. To this end, the US has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for developing an electric vehicle battery value chain in the DRC and Zambia and pledged over US$ 4 billion to the Lobito Corridor project that connects Angola's Atlantic coast to the DRC through Zambia.

The unstable political and economic environment in the DRC makes operations difficult, and the US has failed to incentivise American mining companies to remain active in the region. However, at an enterprise level, American presence in African mining is limited. Even before the reemergence of the M23 security threat, American mining companies were reducing their footprint in the DRC.

For example, Freeport-McMoRan, one of the largest American mining companies, sold its stake in the Tenke copper mine and the Kisanfu cobalt and copper resource to China Molybdenum, a Chinese mining company. The unstable political and economic environment in the DRC makes operations difficult, and the US has failed to incentivise American mining companies to remain active in the region. While ending the war would eliminate one of the biggest disincentives to investment, additional efforts to attract sustained engagement may be required, given the region’s fragile governance structures.

Terms of the Deal and Potential Impact

The Peace Agreement sees the DRC and Rwanda pledging to launch a regional economic integration framework within 90 days and a joint security coordination mechanism within 30 days. It calls for the complete neutralisation of FDLR, and in response to that, a cessation of defensive action by Rwanda and the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from Congolese territory within 90 days. While this deal is a big step for the region, the absence of any mention of the withdrawal of M23, the group most central to the current conflict, has caused scepticism about its effectiveness. Rwanda continues to deny its ties to the group, labelling it a domestic Congolese issue that Kigali cannot influence. Qatar is currently leading mediation efforts between the DRC and M23, but the absence of M23 from the US-brokered process undermines its on-ground impact.

This new agreement, however, establishes links for bilateral cooperation through mineral access, governance, traceability, and regional integration. It is an attempt to create an alternative to zero-sum geopolitics through a model of mutual gain. That said, Washington’s role in the implementation of the deal is unclear. With its attention diverted by other conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and the wider Middle East, the US may not be able to provide the necessary long-term political, diplomatic, and financial support required to sustain the deal’s objectives. This will be made harder by the recent cuts to the US foreign aid and development programmes, which have, in the past, taken on a peacebuilding role.

The devastation caused by the conflict will likely necessitate justice mechanisms such as truth, reconciliation, and reparations, which were pivotal in post-conflict recovery in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Africa.

Locals fear that American peace may be enforced violently and that the deal is just a front for protecting American business interests. Minerals are only one driver of conflict. Regional power struggles, historical grievances, poor governance, and land and citizenship disputes require a long-term commitment for resolution. The devastation caused by the conflict will likely necessitate justice mechanisms such as truth, reconciliation, and reparations, which were pivotal in post-conflict recovery in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Africa. It will be difficult to sustain any peace deal without directly addressing M23’s role and investing in community rebuilding instruments.

Conclusion

Minerals brought the peace deal into being, but they will not be sufficient to enforce it. If implemented effectively, the deal presents the opportunity to improve cross-border trade, increase foreign investment and promote responsible resource governance. However, a narrow focus on minerals risks becoming a technocratic fix for a deeply political crisis. Lasting peace hinges on addressing the factors that have undermined stability in the region, such as militia proliferation, ethnic grievances, and institutional dysfunction.

Meanwhile, the US support that lends credibility to the deal is dependent on the success of its mineral-related engagements in the region. Given the challenging investment environment, the US may need to offer additional guarantees, such as government equity and political risk insurance, to encourage American firms to expand their footprint in the region. Ultimately, it will take long-term commitment and a multidimensional strategy to transform the ‘mineral logic’ of the deal into durable peace.

Amoha Basrur is a Junior Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.