FILE - A man attends prayers at a mosque in Libreville, Gabon, Jan. 27, 2017. Muslims invited Christians to join in their prayers for peace on April 10, 2024, as the country holds meetings to discuss transferring power to a civilian government.
YAOUNDE, CAMEROON — In Gabon, Christians joined Muslims this week to pray for peace as the country holds a month-long “national dialogue” intended to pave the way for military leaders to transfer power to a civilian government.
Clerics say that among the approximately 700 civilians who attended this year’s Eid al-Fitr prayers Wednesday at the Central Mosque in Gabon's capital, Libreville, were scores of Christians. The Eid al-Fitr prayers marked the end of the holy month of Ramadan.
Tidjani Babagana, grand imam of Muslims in Gabon, told Gabon's state TV that during prayers he launched an appeal for reconciliation, peace, temperance and internal harmony among citizens who are looking forward to changes at the helm of the government. He also reminded civilians who are waiting for the government to improve their living conditions that it is a prescription in the Holy Quran to respect state authority.
Babagana said both Muslims and Christians should celebrate Eid al-Fitr as a sign of fraternity, interreligious tolerance and living together in peace, despite the challenges Gabon is facing.
The faithful who gathered for prayers say the country has suffered a crime wave — including theft, assault and highway robbery — since transitional president General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema ordered the release of over 500 prisoners in late March.
The general seized power from President Ali Bongo in a bloodless coup last August. Nguema said he took control to improve living conditions in the oil-producing nation because its citizens remained poor during the 56 years of leadership by Ali Bongo and his father, Omar Bongo.
Gabon's Civil Society Group says the central African state now faces the challenges of a transition to civilian rule. A transitional charter introduced by the general last November bars all members of the current government from becoming candidates in presidential elections, with the exception of Nguema.
This month, Nguema launched what is billed as an Inclusive National Dialogue, which he said will prepare an economic blueprint and a calendar to organize elections that will hand power to civilians.
Gabon opens national dialogue to bring country back to civilian rule
Bruno Nguema Ela, the president of Gabon's citizens in the diaspora, took part in Eid al-Fitr prayers. He said opposition and civil society want Nguema to reassure civilians that he will not hang on to power.
Ela said Gabon's diaspora is happy with efforts by Nguema to stop the Bongo dynasty from maintaining its grip on power, and added that the transitional government should make sure it hands power to civilians so Gabon does not sink into social unrest and political crisis.
Firman Maurice Nguema, one of the spokespersons with the commission that will lead discussions in Gabon's national dialogue, said General Nguema is committed to providing Gabon with functioning state institutions before handing power to constitutional order. He said Nguema wants Gabon to be a peaceful country where democratic choices and rights and liberties of civilians are respected.
The transitional government says Christians joined Muslims in feasts across the central African state this week. Muslim clerics say that nationwide, prayers were for peace and a return to constitutional order without chaos. VOA
Kenya’s veteran opposition leader and former prime minister Raila Odinga. PHOTO | NMG
Djibouti’s entry into the race for the next African Union Commission (AUC) chairperson on Tuesday could see member states in two key blocs in the Eastern Africa region take sides ahead of the voting next year.
Djibouti officially confirmed it was fronting its Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf as a candidate for the next AUC chairperson, becoming the third person to show interest in the continental top post. Kenya’s opposition leader Raila Odinga and Somalia’s former Foreign Affairs minister Fawzia Adam had announced their candidature earlier.
Djibouti’s Foreign Affairs Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. PHOTO | X via Mahmoud Ali Youssouf (@ymahmoudali)
But while the post will only be contested by countries in Eastern Africa, Djibouti’s entry means there won’t be unity on one candidate for now, continuing a past trend.
Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia belong to the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (Igad), which includes Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan and Eritrea.
Sudan is suspended from taking part in African Union activities for now and is ineligible to vote following an October 2021 coup.
Kenya and Somalia also belong to the East African Community (EAC), which also includes Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, DR Congo, Uganda and South Sudan. In ordinary circumstances, they usually coalesce around one candidate to raise their chances. Sometimes it is not always the case.
Until rules were changed to allow rotation of posts, these countries often went for each other’s turfs. In 2017, Kenya fronted a candidate for the AUC chairperson’s position and Djibouti went for the deputy, a sure way of dividing the vote as each looked for support from the same allies who were also seeking other positions and hence needed trade-offs.
Eventually, after Kenya’s Amina Mohamed lost to Chadian diplomat Mahamat Faki, claims of “betrayal” emerged from Nairobi. Djibouti would late issue a statement refuting giving its vote to another candidate, however.
The three candidates, nonetheless, offer each of these countries a chance to galvanise locally as well as hunt for votes from other blocs not eligible to front the chair. The deputy AUC chair will go to the north, while three other regions; south, west and central will compete for the remaining commissioner positions.
Youssouf, 59, a multilingual Djiboutian has served in the Foreign Ministry since the 1990s. His government said his experience in diplomatic work gives him an edge over his competitors, saying he knows the intricacies of the AUC and is ready to “serve and breathe new life into the pan-African organisation.”
The career diplomat is credited with conflict resolution through dialogue and negotiation in discharging his duties and is multilingual, fluent in French, English and Arabic. His campaign team includes some regional political experts, including, incidentally, a veteran Somali diplomat.
Kenya has already embarked on shuttle diplomacy, mounting a campaign team drawn from both President William Ruto’s side and Mr Odinga’s Azimio la Umoja Kenya Coalition.
Dr Ruto and Mr Odinga have sought the support of EAC heads of State and government as well as others beyond the bloc, the latest being the Ghana President Nana Akufo-Addo.
The campaign, however, is set to officially commence next month once all interested candidates submit their applications.
The holder of the office is elected and serves a four-year term renewable once.
“The African Union Executive Council today unanimously adopted a critical decision that it is the turn of the Eastern Africa region to submit candidates for the position of Chairperson of the African Union Commission. The elections will be held in February 2025,” the statement dated March 15, 2024, read in part.
Djibouti has challenged Kenya before in international elections when it bid for the UN Security Council membership even though the AU had endorsed Nairobi for the non-permanent position.
Djibouti would lose in the second round after Kenya garnered the relevant two-thirds majority vote for the seat for the 2021-22 term. This year, Djibouti has not bid for the position, which is open for the eastern Africa region again. Instead, Somalia received the AU endorsement to go ahead with campaigns for the June 2024 vote, for the 2025-26 term. By ROSELYN OBALA, The East African
Once one of the poorest countries in the world, Botswana has experienced growth and development post-independence at a pace second to none. Today, Botswana stands as the least corrupt nation in mainland Africa, boasts the highest economic freedom score in the region, and maintains a GDP per capita on par with other emerging economies, such as Brazil and Turkey. Botswana’s economic, social, and political development represents one of modern Africa’s greatest success stories: a story that provides valuable insights on how strong leadership, with a keen emphasis on pragmatism over ideology, can guide nations out of poverty.
The Protectorate
Botswana’s pragmatism can be traced as far back as the colonial era, which involved uncharacteristically significant cooperation with colonialists. In the mid-19th century, when Tswana chiefdoms found themselves stuck in the “crossfire” between British, German and Boer militants, they made pleas to the British Crown for protection. Following their defeat in the Anglo-Boer War, the British finally agreed and established the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1885. The Protectorate benefitted both the British and the local Tswana (in the short run), providing the former a strategic link between Central and Southern Africa, and the latter protection from Boer threats under the General Act of The Berlin Conference.
Since British interests in Bechuanaland were primarily strategic, not economic, the extent of colonialism was less severe than that of neighboring colonies. The British exercised indirect rule, with administration still consisting of indigenous institutions and leadership of traditional chiefs. The comparatively less grievous (but nonetheless characteristically exploitative) colonial experience may be one reason that Botswana was one of the few African colonies to achieve independence without the emergence of a significant nationalist movement.
One key instance, however, where Britain overstepped “indirect rule” was the expulsion of Sir Seretse Khama, the heir to the chiefdom of Bangwato from Bechuanaland. Khama’s marriage to Ruth Williams was frowned upon by the Cape Colony, where apartheid was enforced and interracial marriage was illegal. The Cape Colony exerted enough pressure on Britain that the House of Commons overturned tribal courts, or kgotlas, and forced Khama into exile in 1951. Nevertheless, he would later be knighted in Britain by Queen Elizabeth II for his political contributions and role in Botswana’s formation.
Khama was only allowed to return to his homeland upon renouncing his chieftainship. Thus, he returned to Bechuanaland in 1956 as a private citizen, founding the Democratic Party of Botswana and gaining domestic legitimacy through democratic support as opposed to ancestral tribal lineage. Khama’s demotion from heir to private citizen would significantly empower Botswana's political development as a stable democracy. By becoming Bechuanaland's prime minister and later the independent Botswana’s first president, he inadvertently transformed the political legacy of the nation from tribal to democratic. Since Khama’s claim to power was now through democracy as opposed to ancestry, his rise would help establish and legitimize republican democracy in Botswana. As a fortunate consequence of his progressive marriage, Botswana became a leader of democracy in Africa, second only to Mauritius in the EIU Democracy Index.
Early Independence
On September 30, 1966, Bechuanaland gained independence, establishing the Republic of Botswana. When Khama was elected to office, the nation had almost no prospects for growth and development. Botswana had a total of 12 kilometers of paved road and only 22 citizens who had attended university. Almost all of its citizens were illiterate (there were, in total, 100 high school graduates) and the nation ranked amongst the poorest in the world by GDP per capita. The newly independent government was reliant on British aid for nearly half of its budget.
Much of colonial Africa turned to nationalism in this period of early statecraft. Some states were able to make considerable progress, though often at the expense of human rights, democracy, or the rule of law. Khama’s approach, on the other hand, avoided radical ideology. He believed that Botswana’s citizens should enjoy increases in standard of living without losing basic civil and political liberties.
Botswana’s economy was dominated by livestock production. Livestock products accounted for more than 90 percent of exports and cattle outnumbered humans about three-to-one. As the nation's primary economic activity, livestock production was not particularly profitable or effective. Drought conditions and insufficient water supply posed real challenges to the sector; at multiple points in the 1960s, Botswana was reliant on famine relief aid to feed its citizens.
To begin expanding the economy beyond its reliance on livestock and towards Botswana’s diverse mineral resources, Khama borrowed heavily from abroad. This brought the tools to Botswana for small scale mining operations, producing some gold, kyanite, copper, and more sizable amounts of asbestos and manganese. While Botswana's early leaders adopted some neoliberal policies, they recognized the dangers of depending on the IMF and World Bank too heavily and thus ensured to keep them at arm’s length.
As Botswana's development began, it once again found itself in an unusually practical arrangement to solve a post colonial issue: the lack of skilled administrators to run the government. Since there were barely a few hundred formally educated local citizens, Khama had former British administrators from the colonial period to continue serving in government until enough qualified locals rose to the responsibility. This sense of pragmatism further extended to Khama’s foreign affairs, as he chose to adopt a policy of non-alignment, distinguishing Botswana from its surrounding regimes without antagonizing them.
Diamonds
Since other countries in the region had vast deposits of diamond reserves, Sir Seretse Khama had good reason to begin the search for diamonds in Botswana. However, many other oil, mineral and diamond rich nations had begun to politically collapse and backslide towards corruption and authoritarianism. This resource curse was exemplified by Nigeria and the Central African Republic, which suffered despite (if not due to) oil and diamond reserves respectively, serving as a cautionary tale for Botswana. Khama organized a unique approach to diamonds in Botswana by striking a deal with the Tswana clan leaders.
Since diamonds could potentially be discovered in some regions but not others, the clan leaders agreed beforehand to a resource-sharing agreement that disregarded domestic territorial claims. This would prevent any ‘geographically lucky’ clans from hoarding the nation’s wealth and ensure that all regions of Botswana reaped the benefits of future diamond mining. Khama struck this deal despite having been slipped the knowledge that his clan’s territory was diamond rich; he put his clan’s interest aside in the name of his nation.
In 1967, a team of De Beers geologists led by Manfred Marx collected soil samples with promising indicators for diamonds near the Kalahari Desert. This led to the development of the Orapa mine for 21 million rand in 1971–the largest open pit diamond mine in the world. To maximize this opportunity, Botswana established Debswana, a joint venture with De Beers. Debswana is the equal partnership between the Government of Botswana and De Beers, which each own half the company. Moreover, ownership of Botswana's Diamond Trading Company was split equally between the government and De Beers. This partnership has been conducive to business, giving both the private and public sector shared responsibility over operations. Under this agreement, De Beers estimates that for every dollar they earn in Botswana, 80 cents goes to the government.
The Orapa mine catapulted Botswana’s economy forward: for the thirty years between 1965 and 1995, Botswana had the fastest rate of economic growth in the world. Debswana’s success enriched the government, which in turn could maintain a stable, low tax rate, further leading to investment from multinational corporations, thus accelerating economic growth.
The profits from diamond production were reinvested by the government in healthcare, education, and infrastructure, which significantly boosted human development. Public hospitals and universities raised social standards in the nation, and infrastructure projects boosted economic accessibility, transforming Botswana into a middle income country. Today, diamond production is responsible for one-third of Botswana's GDP, half of its public spending, and 80 percent of its export revenue.
The Diversification Question
During this period of extreme growth, Botswana co-established the Southern African Development Community to reduce the region's reliance on the economic strength of South Africa and Rhodesia, two militarily aggressive states with little regard for human rights. Botswana abandoned the South African rand and established their own currency, the pula. The Central Bank regulated the pula effectively, meeting the needs of local businesses and making it one of the strongest and best performing currencies on the continent. Botswana displayed the necessary pragmatism to adopt successful policies from other countries, such as “Singapore-inspired work improvement teams” to increase economic productivity. Despite this growth and success, however, Botswana struggled to achieve both political and economic diversity.
Botswana's early successes have not translated to an equal distribution of power and diversity in the political landscape. Following Sir Seretse Khama's death in 1980, he was succeeded by his Vice President, Sir Quett Ketumile Joni Masire. Masire was widely successful, winning reelection for 18 straight years. Despite being a multi-party democracy on paper, since independence, the only party to hold administration in Botswana is the Botswana Democratic Party. The party has been led by two generations of Khama, first between 1966 to 1980 by Sir Seretse Khama and later between 2008 to 2018 by his son, Ian Khama.
No other party has won the general election, a fact that may inadvertently undermine democracy in Botswana in the future. In 2018, Mokgweetsi Masisi from the BDP was elected on a populist platform, marking over 50 years of power for the BDP. It seems unclear whether the BDP's dominance leaves any room for a healthy political landscape; to what extent can democracy in modern Botswana be considered multi-party? Another significant challenge lies in the power De Beers holds over Botswana’s sovereignty. De Beers’ influence over politics could be a major threat to democracy in Botswana. With questions of political diversity and neo-colonialism, new obstacles loom over Botswana’s political class.
Economic diversity is an even greater challenge for Botswana. Despite attempts to move towards a knowledge-based tertiary sector economy, Botswana’s economy remains dominated by diamonds and livestock production. The underdevelopment of other sectors has led to both high wealth inequality and rising unemployment. In June, Botswana struck a revised deal with De Beers to gain more ownership of diamonds mined in Botswana and to introduce downstream operations, such as diamond cutting and polishing, to the economy.
Experts argue this new deal marks the beginning of the end of De Beers’ monopoly over diamond production in Botswana. Moreover, if production continues at its high pace, Botswana may begin to run out of its diamond reserves in the coming decade. If Botswana does manage to overcome stagnation, inequality, and unemployment long term, it would only be by significantly restructuring and diversifying its economy.
With new challenges on the horizon, it is unclear whether Botswana's economic and political legacy will stand tall or begin to collapse. The nation owes much of its prosperity today to the shrewd and pragmatic governance of its early leaders. Will the strong leadership that brought the nation this far live on? Or will Botswana’s economic and political challenges prove too great–and crack Africa’s brightest gem? Source HIR
Only 240 of the reports have been recorded as hate crimes for investigation by Police Scotland, with the vast majority not deemed worthy of further attention.
Publishing figures for the first seven days under Scotland’s new hate crime law on Wednesday, the force said the majority of complainers opted to stay anonymous.
Critics of the new law – which makes it an offence to “stir up” hatred – had warned that it would spark a deluge of vexatious complaints and would waste precious police time.
However, SNP minister Angela Constance, Scotland’s Justice Secretary, defended the new hate crime law and said the number of recorded hate crimes showed why it was “required”.
Ms Constance said: “It is important when we look at the number of hate crimes recorded – 240 – by Police Scotland in one week alone, I think that demonstrates that this legislation is required and needed to protect marginalised and vulnerable communities most at risk of racial hatred and prejudice.”
Police Scotland acknowledged that there had been a “substantial increase” in hate reports since the new law kicked in – but insisted that the impact on frontline policing had been “minimal”.
The Scottish Police Federation (SPF), which represents rank and file officers, told i last week that staff in the command and control centre were “overwhelmed” with hate crime complaints.
The SPF said staff have taken overtime to sift through the huge number of reports, while backroom administration staff have been pulled in to help sort through the claims.
JK Rowling dares police to arrest her as Scotland brings in new hate crime laws
The SNP-led Scottish Government’s new law has established an offence for stirring up hatred over-protected characteristics, including transgender identity, sexual orientation, religion, disability and age.
Police Scotland revealed that 7,152 hate crime complaints were made using an online form, with another 141 made via email and 34 made by telephone – taking the total number of reports to 7,327.
Of these, 240 were recorded as hate crimes – 3.3 per cent of all reports – while 30 were logged as non-crime hate incidents, meaning they did not meet the threshold for a criminal offence, but details will be kept on file.
Some 120 of the crimes reported had a racial aggravator attached, the figures showed, while 42 had an aggravator for sexual orientation, 38 for disability, 21 for both age and religion and eight for transgender identity.
Nearly half of all the complaints made online were made on the first day, the figures showed, before the number of reports slowed later in the week.
Slides produced by Police Scotland also showed that only two complaints made under the new law stemming from the Old Firm match between Rangers and Celtic on Sunday.
Scottish Conservatives said the new official figures showed “the huge toll Humza Yousaf’s shambolic hate crime law is already having on Scotland’s overstretched police force”.
The party’s shadow justice spokesperson Sharon Dowey said: “Humza Yousaf should admit he’s got it badly wrong and bin this disastrous law.”
A Police Scotland spokesperson said: “This data highlights the substantial increase in the number of online hate reports being received since 1 April.
“This significant demand continues to be managed within our contact centres and, so far, the impact on frontline policing, our ability to answer calls and respond to those who need our help in communities across Scotland has been minimal.”
The spokesperson added: “All complaints received are reviewed by officers, supported by dedicated hate crime advisers, and dealt with appropriately, whether that is being progressed for further assessment, or closed as they do not meet the criteria under the legislation.” By Adam Forrest, i News
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) accused the executive of trying to stifle the implementation of the revitalised peace agreement by cash-strapping some electoral bodies.
The Deputy Chairman of SPLM-IO, Oyet Nathaniel, issued a statement on Monday, noting that the act of delayed funding for all the critical institutions signified the lack of political will to implement the R-ARCSS.
Oyet noted that the council of ministers met on February 9 and passed the supplementary budgets for six critical election institutions, but only two of them were funded: the Political Parties Council and the National Elections Commission.
According to Oyet, the Cabinet had cleared a supplementary budget for the electoral bodies in the following manner. The National Constitutional Review Commission was allocated $23.7 million out of $43 million requested, the Political Parties Council $16.3 Million out of $60 Million requested, National Elections Commission $27.2 Million out of $230.5 Million requested, the National Bureau of Statistics $12.1 Million out of $107 million requested, National Transitional Committee $9.4 Million out of $130 Million requested, and elections security by the ministry of interior $13.6 out of $105 Million requested.
However, he noted that only the PPC and the NEC got the partial funding.
He said, “political parties’ council, only $5 million out of the Targeted supplementary budget of $16 Million, and the National Elections Commission with only $15 Million out of the targeted Supplementary budget of $27 million.”
“We would like to state that this is a deliberate plan to undermine the most critical institutions of the agreement leading to the conduct of elections. This further demonstrates the lack of political will for the implementation of the R-ARCSS in letter and spirit,” Oyet noted.
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), one of the main signatories to the R-ARCSS has been vocal about implementing the remaining tasks and funding the pre-election institutions.
In March 2024, during a press conference, the deputy chairman of the SPLM–IO Oyet said his party would not participate in the polls without prerequisite tasks in place for elections.
According to him, some of the prerequisites include a permanent constitution-making process and a National population Census which fall under the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).
Last week, the Chairperson of the Political Parties Council, James Akol, announced that the electoral institutions had enough resources to hold the December polls.
“We all know that in December 2024 there is an election. As such the electoral institutions have been avail sufficient resources necessary, among them is a political party council.
We have the necessary resources that you people need to be able to go for the election “This is an official statement from me that we have been resourced; we have been given the necessary resources that are meant for the election,” said Akol during the validation of the code of conduct for the political parties forum held at the Pyramid Hotel.
Funding cleared for electoral bodies
NCRC- $23.7M out of $43M
PPC- $16.3M out of $60M
NEC- $27.2M out of $230.5M
NBS- $12.1M out of $107M
NTC- $9.4M out of $130M
Security- $13.6M out of $105M By Chol Mawel, Tower Post
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