In a provocative new video titled "Thank you Zimbabwe | The Way Forward After March 31 I More Exposes" posted on YouTube, outspoken political figure Blessed Geza expressed his gratitude to Zimbabweans for their muted yet supportive stance amid national unrest. Geza, who has remained a vocal critic of President Emmerson Mnangagwa's regime, took the opportunity to address several controversial issues affecting the country, including the suppression of peaceful protests, the future of the land reform program, and the political ambitions of business mogul Kudakwashe Tagwirei.

Geza opened the video by thanking Zimbabweans for what he described as their collective decision to "heed their call to take action" amid ongoing tensions and government suppression. He praised the people for their patience, despite facing growing frustration over the economic and political climate. However, he did not shy away from criticizing the Zimbabwe Republic Police for its actions in breaking up peaceful protests led by young citizens in key urban areas like Harare.

"The police response to peaceful protests has been brutal," Geza said, condemning the state's actions in breaking up demonstrations against President Mnangagwa's proposed extended rule. "The voices of young people seeking change are being silenced by force. These protests are not acts of violence; they are cries for help."

The video also turned its focus on Kudakwashe Tagwirei, a powerful ZANU-PF ally and influential businessman in Zimbabwe. Geza accused Tagwirei of working to undermine the country's land reform efforts. Geza argued that Tagwirei and President Mnangagwa have been collaborating to reverse land reforms by allegedly allowing the confiscation of farms from struggling farmers, using banks linked to Tagwirei as a means to seize land.

"Why should Tagwirei’s banks be the only ones authorized to offer loans to farmers, especially when it means they could lose their land in the process?" Geza asked. "This is part of a larger scheme to rob the people of their hard-earned land and reverse the gains of our land reform."

In response, Tagwirei has strongly refuted the accusations. He clarified that his companies, particularly in the banking sector, were not involved in seizing land and emphasized that the introduction of bankable title deeds was intended to help farmers access financial services without forfeiting ownership of their land. He reassured the public that land in Zimbabwe remains state-owned, and the involvement of banks is merely a means of securing financing for agricultural development, not a pathway to expropriation. 

Geza did not stop at criticizing business interests. He also accused Tagwirei of harbouring presidential ambitions, claiming that the businessman is positioning himself to become the next leader of Zimbabwe. 

"Tagwirei is not just interested in running businesses; he wants to be president of Zimbabwe," Geza asserted. "This is a clear attempt to concentrate power in the hands of a few wealthy elites, undermining our democracy."

The remarks about Tagwirei's political aspirations add to the growing political tensions within the ruling ZANU-PF party. As the country faces ongoing economic challenges, many opposition voices are wary of any further consolidation of power by figures with close ties to Mnangagwa’s government. Geza's accusations against Tagwirei add to concerns that Zimbabwe's political system may not be moving toward genuine democratic reforms.

In conclusion, Geza's video further highlighted his vocal opposition to Mnangagwa's leadership. Despite being expelled from ZANU-PF and facing charges of treason, Geza remains active in criticizing the government through platforms like YouTube, where he continues to rally support for change.

While Geza's calls for action have thus far been largely ignored, with most Zimbabweans heeding government calls to stay at home during protests, his videos and statements continue to make waves within the political discourse of the nation. The true impact of his rhetoric, however, will likely only be determined as Zimbabwe approaches key political events in the coming months. As tensions rise, the political climate in Zimbabwe remains uncertain, with figures like Geza at the forefront of efforts to challenge the status quo. By Ndou Psul, Bulawayo 24 News

The much-publicised Elon Musk Africa tour will see him meet developers and politicians in Nairobi on June 13, The Standard can now reveal. 

However, Kenya will be his second destination with the Tesla and SpaceX boss first visiting Cape Town in his country of birth, South Africa. His third stop, which could be the last, will be in Casablanca, Morocco, before he attends a high-level tech summit in Glasgow, Scotland. 

While this trip has been talked about for weeks now, it was unclear, until two days ago, what countries the billionaire is likely to visit.  

Mr Musk's camp's director, Mart Scott, in the first subtle hint at Mr Musk's potential Nairobi visit, said during a news conference in Washington: "We have huge plans for Kenya, which is the gateway to East and Central Africa. Starlink will revolutionize communications in Africa- and every gateway will be important."

An excited pro-government legislator told us Sunday that this is yet the biggest endorsement of the current regime. Mr Musk will be received like a head of state, said the MP, and he could be asked to address a joint sitting of both houses of Parliament. 

"Technically, he is the closest thing to Donald Trump that we will hope to see in Kenya," said the legislator, who declined to be named for fear of reprisal by his party leader. "Nairobi will come to a standstill to pay respect to a king."

Insiders say that top hotels in some of Kenya's biggest getaways have been contacted, with one, in specific, confirming that it was asked to be ready for "a very special guest" by what it termed as "American intelligence". 

It is rumoured that Mr Musk could be preparing to open a technology hub in Nairobi, as well as a Tesla manufacturing plant, but this remains to be seen.  

Late last year, Mr Musk hailed Kenya's software engineers who reached the finals of the World Softonic Competathon held in Rome, Italy, eventually losing to China, the US and Germany. 

His newfound dalliance with Kenya, which has been kept relatively low-key, could attract many more investors into the country, catapulting it to the top of the list of Africa's biggest economies.  

Born in South Africa, Elon Musk made a name for himself in The US, where he has started and ran a number of successful multi-billion dollar companies. Tesla, X, SpaceX, Starlink and The Boring Company are some of his most famous companies.

In addition to these, he has taken a key role in government, running the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) since President Trump's January swearing in. DOGE is meant to manage the spending of American taxpayers' money, therefore creating transparency in government. 

While he is labeled a genius by some, there are those who strongly feel he is interfering with pre-established ways of running government, the ire palpable among Democrats who insist Mr Musk was never elected by Americans and thus should not be at the heart of government operations. 

However, President Trump has defended Mr Musk fiercely, calling him "a tremendous man" and insisting that he is the only American "who can get things done at that level".

While it seems like a long shot, some hope that Mr Musk's visit to Kenya will pave the way for Mr Trump's, a decade since former president Barack Obama was in Nairobi. 

Alongside leaders who have been promised an interview opportunity and lunch with Mr Musk, a few university students will also be allowed a chance to interact with him at a special luncheon which could be held at The State House, according to insider information.

Further, one of the top-rated governors is lobbying to have Mr Musk fly over his county, which is near the city, to have a glimpse of what the county government is trying to do, to acquire more funding for projects. It remains to be seen if some of these more unorthodox requests will be accepted. By Peter Theuri, The Standard

Addis Abeba – In recent times, I have followed with interest a range of articles and commentaries reflecting both praise and criticism of the current administration in the Somali Regional State. The perspectives have been varied—some highlighting notable achievements since 2018, while others raise valid concerns about ongoing governance challenges. Having carefully considered arguments from both sides, I have chosen to pen this piece as an impartial observation, aiming to offer a balanced reflection that acknowledges the progress made while also underscoring the importance of embracing constructive critique as part of any meaningful reform process. 

In 2018, the Somali region marked a significant political shift, one that many hoped would reset the region’s governance trajectory. With the end of a decade-long authoritarian administration, expectations were high for an inclusive, accountable, and development-focused era. Seven years on, the region presents a mixed picture—marked by clear signs of progress, tempered by ongoing challenges. 

This article seeks to move beyond polarized discourse and examine the current governance landscape in the Somali Region in a measured way. The aim is neither to idealize the post-2018 leadership nor to dismiss its achievements. Rather, it is to encourage a culture of governance where self-reflection and critical engagement are seen as strengths—not threats. 

To begin with, it would be unfair not to recognize the positive transformations that have taken root since the political changes of 2018. Most notable among these is the dramatic shift in political tone. Gone are the days when dissent was punished and civic space severely restricted. The region has since seen a resurgence of public dialogue, community organizing, and civil society engagement. 

The absence of political prisoners, reports of reduced extrajudicial arrests, and the increase in media outlets operating with relative freedom all signal a move toward a more open political culture. Citizens, particularly youth, have found greater room to voice their opinions, organize, and participate in local initiatives. 

Institutionally, there have been notable steps toward transparency. The establishment of a procurement agency, restructuring of regional bureaus, and public announcement of tenders and contracts are important shifts away from the opaque, centralized control of the past. The current administration has also placed visible emphasis on expanding public infrastructure, particularly in urban areas, with new roads, health centers, and administrative buildings taking shape.

On the economic front, the region has witnessed improved trade flows, particularly with neighboring countries, due in part to relative security stability. This has helped support a growing service sector, including the expansion of transportation, telecommunications, and microfinance initiatives.

Importantly, these gains should not be overlooked by observers, analysts, or critics. Reform is often non-linear, and the context in which these changes are unfolding—including broader national transitions, periodic instability, and resource constraints—must be factored into any fair evaluation.

Yet, reform cannot rest solely on symbolism or relative improvement. The daily experiences of many communities in the Somali Region reflect a gap between policy pronouncements and tangible delivery. For reforms to take root, they must move beyond high-level shifts and be felt at the grassroots level.

Despite institutional restructuring, concerns remain about the merit-based nature of appointments and the degree of political interference in public service recruitment. Local feedback, especially from zonal and district officials, often points to perceived favoritism and informal patronage networks—albeit less overt than in the past.

Procurement practices, while improved in transparency, still face questions around fairness and consistency. Recent internal audits from select bureaus have flagged irregularities in contract awards and resource utilization, suggesting a need for deeper institutionalization of checks and balances. Without independent oversight bodies that are empowered and resourced to investigate and act, reforms remain vulnerable to reversal. Leaders who embrace critique signal confidence in their governance; those who reject it outright risk insulating themselves from reality.”

Service delivery also remains uneven. While urban centers like Jigjiga have seen visible development, many rural and pastoralist communities continue to lack basic services—clean water, electricity, healthcare, and education. Several districts in the Dollo, Fafan, and Erer zones continue to struggle with understaffed clinics, unpaved roads, and under-resourced schools.

Moreover, resilience to climate shocks, such as drought and conflict-related displacement, remains weak. Although the region has developed contingency plans and early warning systems, their implementation has been inconsistent. The region still relies heavily on federal agencies and international NGOs for emergency response—an indication that local capacity and coordination mechanisms need reinforcement.

Justice sector reform is another area requiring sustained focus. While political detentions have decreased, access to legal aid and the independence of lower-level courts remain limited. In many areas, traditional mechanisms continue to dominate dispute resolution, which can marginalize women, youth, and minorities.

Balancing Reform, Critique, and Accountability

Amid these developments, the political and public response to criticism remains a sensitive issue. In a maturing democratic setting, feedback—especially from citizens, media, researchers, and civil society—should be seen as a cornerstone of effective governance, not as an attack on authority.

Too often, critical perspectives are dismissed as uninformed, politically motivated, or nostalgic for past regimes. This defensive posture stifles meaningful dialogue and risks alienating constituencies who feel their concerns are not heard. Leaders who embrace critique signal confidence in their governance; those who reject it outright risk insulating themselves from reality.

The way forward is not in silencing concerns or framing criticism as disloyalty. Rather, it is in responding with evidence, engaging in respectful dialogue, and using feedback to recalibrate programs, improve service delivery, and build trust. Genuine accountability is not about avoiding mistakes—it is about how institutions respond when those mistakes are brought to light.

In this sense, the Somali region has a critical opportunity. By fostering a culture where transparency is not just procedural but participatory, the region can position itself as a model for other parts of the country. Encouraging open debate, supporting watchdog institutions, and strengthening media freedom are investments in long-term stability—not threats to power.

As the Somali region moves into its seventh year of post-2018 governance, the question is no longer whether reform has begun—it has. The question now is whether that reform is evolving into a sustainable, inclusive, and accountable governance system.

This requires shifting from a reform narrative focused on contrasting with the past to one grounded in present-day metrics. It means defining success not only by what has been avoided but also by what has been achieved. And it means viewing citizen engagement not as a political liability but as a necessary component of resilient governance.

The most enduring legacy of the current administration will not be its break from the past but its openness to shape the future collaboratively—with its citizens, critics, and institutions. A mature political environment allows space for both praise and challenge, for recognition and rethinking.

The Somali region, with its unique history and demographic vibrancy, has the tools to lead such a transition. What’s needed now is the political will to move from defensiveness to dialogue, from reform language to reform outcomes, and from central narratives to inclusive governance. 

By Hussien Mohamed Yusuf AS

SADC Ministers of Employment and Labour and Social Partners held their annual meeting in Victoria Falls, Republic of Zimbabwe from 27 to 28 March 2025. 

The Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Honourable Edgar Moyo, officially opened the meeting, reaffirming SADC’s unwavering commitment to sustainable socio-economic development and poverty eradication. The Honourable Minister underscored the critical importance of pro-employment strategies in productive sectors such as agriculture and mining, to ensure labour-intensive growth.

To address this, he urged Member States to adopt and implement responsive National Employment Policies (NEPs) that are well-integrated into broader socio-economic policies and strategies. Furthermore, he stressed the need for enhanced regional cooperation in sharing best practices to collectively tackle unemployment. Recognising the significant decent work deficits in the informal economy, he highlighted the urgent need to address structural transformation challenges to facilitate a transition to formality, including the creation of an enabling business environment and extension of social protection coverage.  

The SADC Deputy Executive Secretary for Regional Integration, Ms. Angele Makombo Ntumba, echoed concerns about the worsening employment situation across the region and called for urgent measures to develop more coherent and well-coordinated employment strategies. Given the persistently high youth unemployment rates, she highlighted the importance of equipping young people with the requisite skills, particularly through Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) programmes that promote joint-sector cooperation and active private sector participation.

She also stressed the need to adopt digital solutions to modernise TVET delivery, ensuring alignment with emerging economic opportunities. On labour migration, she acknowledged the progress made in migration governance in several Member States, particularly through the enactment of new legal frameworks on fair and ethical recruitment. She reaffirmed the Secretariat’s commitment to supporting Member States in strengthening regional integration efforts in employment and labour, especially through capacity-building and resource mobilisation for key interventions.

Following their deliberations, the Ministers and Social Partners: 

1. Noted that the Republic of Angola had become the first Member State to ratify the SADC Protocol on Employment and Labour of 2023, which establishes the regional cooperation framework on decent work. They welcomed the update that the signed instrument of ratification would be deposited with the Secretariat in due course. They commended the Republics of Botswana, Mozambique, United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe for signing the Protocol during the Summit held in August 2024. Accordingly, they urged all Member States to complete their national processes for signature and ratification by 2026 in line with previous Ministerial decisions. 
2. Urged Member States to develop and implement comprehensive National Employment Policies (NEPs) aligned with National Development Plans and macroeconomic policies, noting with concern that very few Member States had up-to-date frameworks. In this regard, they directed the Secretariat to develop regional guidelines to enhance coordination and implementation of these policies, emphasizing the need for dedicated budget allocations and stronger institutional capacity.
3. Noted that SADC Member States were progressively implementing the most recent international statistical standards to produce labour statistics and were, therefore, at an advanced stage towards finalisation of the SADC Labour Market Observatory (LMO). They approved the Revised SADC LMO data master plan and commended Botswana and South Africa for successfully launching their national Labour Market Information Systems. 
4. Endorsed the draft Revised SADC TVET Strategic Framework (2025-2034) which seeks to enhance skills development and employability, particularly for youth, through closer collaboration between training institutions and industries. Accordingly, the Ministers and Social Partners referred the strategic framework to SADC Ministers of Education and Training and Science, Technology and Innovation for further consideration and approval in June 2025. 
5. Noted progress in the implementation of the SADC Labour Migration Action Plan (2020-2025), noting the plans by the SADC Secretariat to convene a Joint Meeting of Chiefs of Immigration and Labour Commissioners to enhance regional cooperation on labour migration issues. Among other actions to enhance labour migration governance, they urged Member States to establish and strengthen dedicated labour migration coordination structures and units. 
6. Approved the establishment of a SADC Employment and Labour Sector Forum on Labour Relations in the Public Sector to strengthen labour administration systems by promoting the harmonisation of laws and practices governing public and private sector workers. In addition, they requested the Chair of SADC to undertake consultations with key stakeholders with a view to proposing the establishment of a SADC Public Service Commissions Forum. 
7. Noted Member States’ commitment to uphold international labour standards and commended Zambia for ratifying the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No. 190 on violence and harassment in the workplace. They urged all Member States to expedite ratification of remaining prioritised conventions, particularly those related to occupational safety and health (Convention No. 155 and Convention No. 187). In this regard, they requested continued technical support from the ILO for gap analyses and alignment of national laws.
8. Endorsed Zimbabwe’s candidacy for the position of President of the 113th International Labour Conference, to be held in June 2025 in Geneva, Switzerland, and requested Member States’ support for the bid. 
9. Received reports from the SADC Private Sector Forum and the Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council and reiterated their commitment to social dialogue at national and regional levels. 

The Ministers and Social Partners ended their annual meeting with a working visit to the Zambezi Crocodile Farm, where they gained insights into Zimbabwe's approaches to social security and workplace safety and health in the agriculture sector. The visit included a guided tour showcasing sustainable farming operations, highlighting the importance of decent work in enhancing labour protection and productivity in key economic sectors.  

Thirteen (13) Member States (Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) participated in the meeting, together with Social Partners who were led by the SADC Private Sector Forum (SPSF) and Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC). Representatives of the ILO and International Organisation for Migration (IOM) also participated in the meeting and reiterated their support to regional integration in SADC.   Remarks by Hon Minister Edgar Moyo / Remarks by SADC Deputy Executive Secretary for Regional Integration