According to information published by The Sudan Times on August 15, 2025, Sudan’s ruling military council, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has finalized a sweeping $1.5 billion defence agreement with Pakistan, marking one of the most consequential arms purchases in the country’s modern history. The deal was sealed during a high-level visit by a Sudanese delegation to Islamabad, headed by Lieutenant General Pilot Al-Tahir Mohammed Al-Awad Al-Amin, commander of the Sudanese Air Force, and included direct talks with Pakistan’s defence minister, the air force chief, and senior figures from Pakistan’s defence industry.

Chinese HQ-9 missile system: with these new armaments, Sudan’s junta expects to reverse the civil war by using drones for persistent strikes, jets for close air support, and advanced missile systems to secure contested airspace (Picture source: Wikipedia)

The package includes an array of air, land, and air defence systems that significantly upgrade the Sudanese Armed Forces’ combat capabilities. Among the acquisitions are 10 K-8 Karakorum light attack and trainer jets, 20 Shahpar-2 combat drones, 150 YIHA-III tactical drones, 50 MR-10K surveillance UAVs, and 50 Ababeel-5 long-range strike drones. Deliveries will also include engines for Sudan’s aging MiG-21 fleet, 150 Mohafiz armoured security vehicles, and advanced Chinese-made HQ-9 and HQ-6 surface-to-air missile systems. Initial shipments are expected before the close of 2025, signalling a rapid modernization effort aimed at altering the battlefield balance.

The composition of the deal reveals a multi-layered approach to strengthening the SAF’s order of battle. The Karakorum jets provide dual utility as both advanced trainers and light attack aircraft for counterinsurgency missions. The Shahpar-2 and Ababeel-5 UAVs introduce long-range strike capacity, while tactical YIHA-III and MR-10K drones offer battlefield reconnaissance, target designation, and loitering capability. On the ground, the Mohafiz armoured vehicles enhance mobility and protection for infantry units in urban and desert operations. The acquisition of HQ-9 and HQ-6 missile systems is particularly significant, as it provides Sudan with a robust air defence shield capable of deterring both conventional aircraft and hostile UAV incursions.

From a tactical and operational standpoint, the integration of drones and missile defences could reshape the ongoing conflict with the Rapid Support Forces. Persistent ISR from tactical drones will allow SAF units to track RSF movements, coordinate precision strikes, and disrupt supply corridors. The Ababeel-5 UAVs, with their extended range and strike payloads, can target RSF command centers deep in contested territory. Meanwhile, the HQ-9 and HQ-6 systems give the Sudanese military the means to secure critical airspace around Khartoum and major garrisons, reducing the risk of surprise attacks and denying the RSF freedom of manouver in the skies. Together, these assets would tilt the tactical balance heavily toward the SAF, enabling a transition from defensive attrition to offensive operations.

Financing of the contract through a third-party nation is considered likely due to Sudan’s limited financial resources and its restricted access to international credit markets. Western sanctions imposed over human rights abuses and ongoing conflict make direct procurement deals almost impossible. By using Gulf or Turkish channels, Khartoum gains access to external capital flows while masking the full extent of its defence purchases from international scrutiny. This indirect mechanism also shields Islamabad from political backlash by presenting the deal as part of a broader multilateral arrangement rather than a direct cash transfer from Sudan.

For al-Burhan’s junta, the acquisition of such armaments is driven by both internal and external imperatives. Domestically, the SAF is struggling to contain the RSF’s entrenched urban positions and their control over key trade routes, making advanced drones and armoured vehicles critical for regaining operational initiative. Externally, Sudan faces pressure from neighbouring powers watching the conflict’s outcome closely, with Egypt, Ethiopia, and Gulf states all having vested interests in the country’s stability. By modernizing its forces, the junta seeks not only to consolidate power at home but also to project resilience abroad, signalling that Sudan can survive without Western support and will instead align itself with Asian and Middle Eastern defence partners.

The timing of the agreement underscores its strategic weight. Sudan’s internal conflict between the national armed forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has entered its second year with no political solution in sight. Diplomatic initiatives from the African Union and IGAD have stalled, while humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate. By turning to Pakistan and China for advanced weapons, al-Burhan is betting on overwhelming firepower to shift the war in the SAF’s favour rather than pursuing compromise.

The deal represents not only a massive leap in Sudan’s UAV and air defence capabilities but also a decisive pivot toward prolonged conflict. The integration of Pakistani and Chinese systems gives the SAF a clear technological edge, positioning drones and missile defences at the core of its strategy. For the wider region, the agreement raises the prospect of further instability, as foreign-backed arms inflows harden battle lines and diminish prospects for peace. The international community is now faced with an urgent dilemma: how to respond to a war that is being reshaped by external suppliers and escalating into one of the most heavily armed internal conflicts in Africa. Global Defence News