Sudanese authorities systematically block the delivery of aid to some areas, while the RSF has looted health facilities and supplies.
A chronic lack of response from humanitarian organisations and the UN have made an already dire situation in Sudan desperate.
MSF urges the warring parties to allow humanitarian aid and access, and for the UN and organisations to immediately scale up their response.
PORT SUDAN/DARFUR – In one of the world's worst crises for decades, Sudan is facing a colossal, man-made catastrophe, one year after the start of the war between the government-led Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). It is a matter of life or death for millions of people to urgently enable safe humanitarian access. As governments, officials, aid organisations, and donors meet on 15 April in Paris to discuss ways to improve the delivery of humanitarian aid, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is making an urgent call for them to immediately scale up the humanitarian response.
Millions of people are at risk, yet the world is turning a blind eye as the warring parties intentionally block humanitarian access and the delivery of aid. The United Nations (UN) and member states must redouble their efforts towards negotiating safe and unhindered access, and to scale up the humanitarian response to prevent this already desperate situation from deteriorating any further.
“People in Sudan are suffering immensely as heavy fighting persists —including bombardments, shelling and ground operations in residential urban areas and in villages — and the health system and basic services have largely collapsed or been damaged by the warring parties,” says Jean Stowell, MSF head of mission in Sudan. “Only 20 to 30 per cent of health facilities remain functional in Sudan, meaning that there is extremely limited availability of healthcare for people across the country.”
Every day we see patients dying because of violence-related injuries, children perishing due to malnutrition... Despite all this, there is an extremely disturbing humanitarian void.JEAN STOWELL, MSF HEAD OF MISSION IN SUDAN
In areas close to hostilities, MSF teams have treated women, men and children injured by stray bullets and in the fighting, including shrapnel wounds, blast and gunshot injuries. Since April 2023, MSF-supported facilities have received more than 22,800 cases of trauma injuries and performed more than 4,600 surgeries, many of them related to the violence which occurred in Khartoum and Darfur. In Wad Madani, a town surrounded by three active frontlines, we currently see 200 patients per month with violence-related injuries.
According to the UN, more than eight million people have already been forced to flee their homes and been displaced multiple times, and 25 million – half of the country’s population – are estimated to need humanitarian assistance.
“Every day we see patients dying because of violence-related injuries, children perishing due to malnutrition and the lack of vaccines, women with complications after unsafe deliveries, patients who have experienced sexual violence, and people with chronic diseases who cannot access their medicines,” says Stowell. “Despite all this, there is an extremely disturbing humanitarian void.”
Although MSF works in good cooperation with the Ministry of Health, the Government of Sudan has persistently and deliberately obstructed access to humanitarian aid, especially to areas outside of their control. It has systematically denied travel permits for humanitarian staff and supplies to cross the front lines, restricted the use of border crossings, and established a highly restrictive process for obtaining humanitarian visas.
“Today, our biggest challenge is the scarcity of medical supplies,” says Ibrahim*, an MSF doctor working in Khartoum. “We’ve run out of surgical equipment, and we are on the brink of stopping all work unless supplies arrive.”
Khartoum is a city that has been under blockade for the past six months. A similar situation has been impacting the city of Wad Madani since January.
In RSF-controlled areas, where many different militias and armed groups also operate, health facilities and warehouses were frequently looted in the first months of the conflict. Incidents such as carjackings happen on a regular basis, and medical workers, particularly from the Ministry of Health, have been harassed and arrested.
In hard-to-reach areas like Darfur, Khartoum or Al-Jazirah, we often find ourselves the only, or one of the few, international humanitarian organisations present. The needs far exceed our capacity to respond. Even in more accessible areas such as White Nile, Blue Nile, Kassala and Gedaref states, the overall response is negligible: a drop in the ocean.
One example is the catastrophic malnutrition crisis in Zamzam camp in North Darfur, where there have been no food distributions from the World Food Programme since May 2023. Almost a quarter (23 per cent) of children we screened there in a rapid assessment in January were found to have acute malnutrition – seven per cent were severe cases. Forty per cent of pregnant and breastfeeding women were suffering from malnutrition, and there was a devastating mortality rate across the camp of 2.5 deaths per 10,000 people per day.
We’ve run out of surgical equipment, and we are on the brink of stopping all work unless supplies arrive.IBRAHIM*, AN MSF DOCTOR WORKING IN KHARTOUM
“The situation in Sudan was already very fragile before the war and it has now become catastrophic,” says Ozan Agbas, MSF Emergency Operations Manager for Sudan. “In many of the areas where MSF has started emergency activities, we have not seen the return of the international humanitarian organisations that initially evacuated in April last year.”
Khadija Mohammad Abakkar, who had to flee her home in Zalingei, Central Darfur, in search of safety, recounts how difficult it was to survive without humanitarian assistance: “During the fighting, there was no access to healthcare or food in the camp. I sold my belongings to earn some money for food.”
While these are difficult conditions in which to operate, the response should have increased, not diminished, especially in the areas where access is possible. Increased efforts are urgently needed by all humanitarian organisations to find solutions to these problems and scale up activities across the country.
“The United Nations and their partners have persisted in self-imposed restrictions on accessing these regions,” says Agbas. “As a result, they have not even pre-positioned themselves to intervene or establish teams on the ground when opportunities arise.”
MSF calls on the warring parties to adhere to International Humanitarian Law and the humanitarian resolutions of the Jeddah declaration by putting in place mechanisms to protect civilians and to ensure safe humanitarian access to all areas of Sudan without exception – including stopping blockages. MSF also calls on the UN to show more boldness in the face of this enormous crisis and to focus on clear results related to increasing access so that they actively contribute towards enabling a rapid and massive scale-up of humanitarian assistance. MSF also urges donors to increase funding for the humanitarian response in Sudan.
The army has advised residents within Gulu City not to panic as Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) soldiers take part in a day-long arms training drill on Friday.
Maj. Nicholas Abiribale, the Civil-Military Coordination officer at the Fourth Infantry Division told URN on Thursday that the training will involve the firing of live bullets in the areas of Gulu airfield in Bardege-Layibi Division.
Maj. Abiribale noted that the drill would commence at 6 am till 6 pm and asked residents to keep out of the area for their safety. He also asked the locals not to leave their animals to roam around the areas.
He noted that the exercise is a routine activity undertaken to keep the soldiers alert. According to Maj Abiribale, the exercise will entail the firing of light and heavy weapons that may cause some members of the public to panic.
It is unclear how many soldiers will take part in the exercise, Uganda Radio Network however reliably understands that soldiers ranging from privates to the highest-ranking officers including the Division Commander will take part.
But Bardege-Layibi Division Mayor Patrick Oola Lumumba notes that whereas the army has issued the public announcement, it hasn’t liaised with the local area leaders for sensitization of the masses.
“We are surprised that the army hasn’t informed the local leaders to sensitize the locals about the exercise yet the shooting site is within a civilian population. This may turn out disastrous for others without prior knowledge and worst of all, some may collapse,” Lumumba told URN on Thursday.
He however requested the army to conduct sensitization so that locals are not caught unaware leading to incidences of injuries or even death. By URN/Tower Post
Parliament passed the Privatization Act of 2023, which was assented to by President William Ruto on October 9, 2023, that repealed the Privatization Act of 2005. [PCS]
A fresh bid to stop the government’s plan to sell some hotels and parastatals has been lodged before the High Court. The Kenya Kwanza administration is being accused of skirting the law that requires the government to involve the National Assembly and the Treasury Cabinet Secretary for approvals and oversight. The case has been filed by at least 200 human rights groups under the Civil Society Reference Group (CRSG).
According to their lawyer Kevin Oriri, the current arrangement is illegal and void as the Executive has created a vague process to sell government assets. He argues that there will be no one to account for or be queried if Kenya Kwanza goes ahead with the plot to sell State agencies. The lobby groups have sued the Privatization Authority, which is charged with overseeing the sale, and the Cabinet.
They are challenging a move by the authority to invite interested buyers to bid for KWAL Holdings (KHEAL), Kenya Wine Agencies Limited, and the Development Bank of Kenya. Others are Kenya Hotel Properties Limited and the Kenya Development Corporation (KDC), which is the Kenya Safari Lodges and Hotels Limited which incorporates Mombasa Beach Hotel, Ngulia Safari Lodge and Voi Safari Lodge.
Also in the list are Golf Hotel Limited, Sunset Hotel Limited, Mt Elgon Lodge Limited, and Kabarnet Hotel Limited. The entities are among 28 that had been identified for privatisation under the Privatization Act of 2005, and publicised through Gazette Notice 8739 of August 14, 2009.
In the case, Mr Oriri, says Parliament passed the Privatization Act of 2023, which was assented to by President William Ruto on October 9, 2023, that repealed the Privatization Act of 2005.
“Under Section 68 of the Privatisation Act, 2023, Gazette Notice 8739 of August 14, 2009 is identified as having lapsed. There is now valid privatisation programme that exists, yet, under the new law, and upon which a basis can be made for the impugned privatisation processes,” says Oriri.
He argues that any process that purports to emanate from the 2009 gazette notice and proceeds as per the requirements of the repealed law is null and void.
The lawyer says the move by the authority is a conspiracy with the Cabinet to commence the privatisation without involving Treasury Cabinet Secretary Njuguna Ndung’u, stakeholders of the said entities, the public, and the National Assembly.
According to the lawyer, after the signing of the Privatization Act of 2023 into law, a new privatisation programme ought to have been established for there to be a legal basis for privatisation. By Fred Kagonye, The Standard
The report aims to provide global and South African insurance market insights.
RESILIENCE remains a fundamental enabler of business strategies in 2024, as many of the economic, geopolitical and humanitarian events that shaped 2023 will continue to evolve in 2024, and new trends will emerge, creating more challenges as well as opportunities, according to Alicia Goosen, head of commercial risk and chief broking officer at Aon South Africa.
Her comments came after Aon South Africa launched its 2024 Insurance State of the Market Report. The report aims to provide global and South African insurance market insights.
Goosen said challenging and unpredictable market conditions have refocused insurance buyers on the value, structure and overall cost of their insurance programme. The makeup of risk transfer is also evolving.
"In most cases, buyers will be faced with decisions around how to manage an ever-expanding and complex risk transfer need. It has never been more important to focus on Total Cost of Risk (TCOR) rather than risk transfer or premium cost.“The current market dynamics create unique opportunity, incredible uncertainty, and risk that is increasingly connected, and more severe. With this change comes a pressing need for businesses to make important decisions, more often.”
According to the report, major trends in the South African insurance market include:
Securing sufficient insurance capacity from local and global insurers continued to be challenging, especially for global programmes and for risk types that were not preferred.
The requirement to provide granular information such as geo-co-ordinates and value splits between property damage and business interruption remained burdensome and challenging for clients.
Inflation impacted underwriting and claims processes.
Natural-catastrophe-related coverage restrictions/exclusions were applied to specific locations, for example, KwaZulu-Natal.
Grid collapse exclusions (Eskom load shedding risks) were fully embedded in underwriter placement terms.
Alternative Risk Transfer mechanisms, valuation services, and business interruption analysis have become more prevalent.
The report said the key trends to watch in 2024 include:
The continued threat posed by cyber risk as cyber attackers continue to exploit vulnerabilities and adapt their methods.
Geopolitical and societal pressure to tackle climate change is mounting as energy transition efforts accelerate, requiring major investment.
The demand for parametric covers will increase as confidence grows, providing a broader, more creative suite of risk management tools.
Political, terrorism, and strike risks loom large in an election year, requiring specialist broking experience in both the local and international insurance markets to structure the best coverage possible.
According to Goosen, Aon works closely with organisations and businesses to identify the risks they are faced with in order to make better decisions when it comes to addressing traditional exposures and emerging risks.
“One of the key drivers of negotiating successful renewals is for clients to be proactive and differentiate their risk, with the current, selective underwriting environment calling for detailed disclosure and business profiles as well as a description of risk management and mitigation efforts.
“It has never been more important for clients to leverage analytical tools like risk modelling and here Aon works closely with the business to ensure that their risk differentiation is on point, and also ensure sufficient lead time for underwriters to review to get positive outcomes,” she said.
Looking ahead, the report said: “We expect many of the economic, geopolitical, and humanitarian events that shaped 2023 to continue to evolve in 2024, and new trends to emerge, creating challenges as well as opportunities.“ Written by Dieketseng Maleke, IOL
Unleashing tens of billions of investment across Africa, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are buying critical minerals and political influence The strategy of the oil-fired Gulf States in Africa appears to be modelled on a foreign policy dictum coined by Ghana's founding President, Kwame Nkrumah: 'We face neither east nor west – we face forwards.' Like Nkrumah, the Gulf monarchs alternate between cutting deals in Washington and Beijing and Moscow. Unlike him, they have trillions of dollars in sovereign wealth funds and face no immediate threats of coups d'état.
Last year in Johannesburg, the Sunni monarchies of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were inducted into the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping at its summit. Along with their regional rival, the Shiite theocracy in Iran, the new BRICS members mean the grouping now produces almost half global oil output.
But Saudi Arabia and the UAE have their sights set on a post-oil future. Just 16.8% of the UAE's gross domestic product came from oil and gas in 2019, down from over 40% in 1980. That's a strategy that African oil producers want to replicate.
The UAE's and Saudi Arabia's investment firepower and post-oil planning has won them multiple business suitors on African projects from Europe and North America. Over the past decade, the UAE has invested over US$60 billion in Africa, compared with Saudi Arabia's more than $25bn in the same period.
Both countries are upping their African targets. The UAE's state-owned Masdar, specialising in renewable energy, says it will invest at least $10bn in green energy projects in Africa by 2030. And at its Africa summit in November Saudi Arabia, pledged to invest another $25bn on the continent over the next seven years.
That explains why the Gulf's ambassadors are widely welcomed in Africa – just when the United States, Europe and China have sharply cut back investments and other financial commitments in Africa. Washington officials encourage, even facilitate, the Gulf States' investments in critical minerals in Africa as a way to balance China's dominance in the sector.
Dualstrategy Among the world's top hydrocarbon producers and presiding over trillions of dollars of investment funding, Saudi Arabia and UAE alternate between today's world of fossil-fuel dependent economies and tomorrow's renewables. As they launch their own transitions, they have a stake in both.
On the public stage they endorse sharp cuts in carbon emissions; privately, they fend off, like US officials, any serious efforts to cut the $7 trillion a year (according to IMF estimates) subsidies on fossil fuels. Such posturing is greatly appreciated by African oil producers, irritated by Western blocks on hydrocarbon investments.
The UAE's chairing of the UN COP28 climate summit in November saw that strategy in action. The conference resembled less a policy meeting to slow climate change than a glorified trade fair bringing together energy companies, from the west and Asia, to negotiate deals. It was globalisation 2.0, run by the middle powers.
The Gulf States are not quite a concert of powers. Personal interests of the ruling monarchs and ideology, to a lesser extent, divide them. Differences between the UAE's Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahayan (MBZ) and Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MBS) have sharpened in recent years. MBZ has led the charge into Africa but Saudi Arabia's MBS is charting his own course.
The two rulers did not share the same hostility towards the Muslim Brothers (MB) and other Islamist movements. MBZ and MBS supported General Abdel Fattah el Sisiin Egypt and funded his coup against President Mohamed Morsi(a Muslim Brother) in 2013. MBZ viscerally opposes the MB in all its manifestations whereas MBS takes a more pragmatic line.
Elsewhere, MBZ endorsed local strongmen against Islamists and Doha-supported politicians and insurgents. In Libya, UAE endorsed General Khalifa Haftar against a 'national unity' government backed by Qatar and Turkey.
Like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the UAE kept lines open to President Omer Ahmed Hassan el Beshir in Sudan, who headed the MB-affiliated National Congress Party.
Having dealt with El Beshir's military officers when Sudan sent mercenaries to fight in Yemen against the Iranian-backed Houthis, MBZ eventually endorsed General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo Hemeti, Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, in Sudan's civil war (AC Vol 64 No 23, Darfuris face a global dereliction of duty). This has earned the UAE international opprobrium for arming the brutal RSF, as documented in successive UN and independent human rights reports.
In Somalia, the UAE endorsed and funded local administrations that opposed the Islamists and those allied with Doha, such as President Mohammed Abdullah Mohammed 'Farmajo'. The UAE has tried to help Puntland, Somaliland, and Jubaland because they were reluctant to follow Mogadishu, Turkey, and Doha internationally.
MBS and his administration take a more nuanced approach that may owe something to Saudi Arabia's role in the Muslim world as guardian of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina.
Saudi officials see deterrence against Iran was seen as an existential imperative but show more pragmatism towards managing the crises triggered by Islamists in the greater region. Through its charities and heavily-funded and networked intelligence systems, Riyadh reckons it can effectively track and neutralise Islamist activists in the region.
Seeing a vacuum left by the West and China, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have started to accord Africa far more attention, in diplomatic and commercial terms. They are racing each other to win new contracts in mining, public works, and logistics.
Privatesectorrules When the private sector is mentioned in the Gulf states, one should look at how the rulers understand their country's interests and also acknowledge that big business in the Gulf states is rooted in the ruling families. No state decision can be made without considering how it will affect the situation of specific firms connected with the ruling elite.
A good example is how 51% of the Zambian Mopani copper mine was sold last year to International Resources Holding (IRH). A UAE company, IRH came late in the biddingwith no specific background on mining against two other companies, one Chinese and the other South African, that are well-known in the sector.
IRH is part of International Holding Company, the $240bn business empire of Tahnoon bin Zayed al Nahayan, son of the founder of UAE, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahayan. Sheikh Tahnoon, who serves as the UAE's national security advisor, also chairs the Royal Group,an Abu Dhabi investment company with links to Primera Group, a gold-exporting company in Congo-Kinshasa (AC Vol 64 No 13, Tshisekedi gives away gold rights to UAE). The Mompani and Primera invetsments are typical of the way that Sheikh Tahnoon acts as the bridge between the state and private companies that deal with strategic issues for the UAE.
Another strategically and commercially successful operation is Dubai Ports (DP) World, which was established in 1999 and has established ports in Angola, Djibouti, Egypt, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, and Somalia. Mohamed bin Rashid al Maktoum is its main shareholder, besides his position as vice-president, prime minister and defence minister of the UAE.
This overlap broadens negotiations across commercial and state sectors. In Zambia, IRH's negotiations went from copper mining to investments in agriculture, tourism, and energy. That may also have happened in Tanzania, where DP World bought two-thirds of the management of Dar es Salaam port over the 30 years for $230m in July 2023. Dar es Salaam is a crucial transhipment point for copper from Zimbabwe and Zambia.
With the Tanzania deal, DP World has a presence on the Indian Ocean coast and the Red Sea up to Egypt (an agreement with Sudan was signed but not yet enforced due to the war).
Compared with Saudi Arabia, the UAE has a greater understanding of policy and tactics and is making itself indispensable to some of Africa's weaker regimes. Such a transactional approach to policy can entangle the UAE in arenas from which it can't escape.
In Libya, the UAE backed Haftar but he failed to takeTripoli despite bombarding the city for weeks. Still a UAE client, Haftar had to come to terms, behind the scenes, with Prime Minister Abdel Hamid Dubaiba's government in Tripoli (AC Vol 63 No 16, Dubaiba woos UAE and Haftar with about-turn on oil).
In Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, having won a pyrrhic victory against the Tigray region, is increasingly in thrall to the UAE for cash and diplomatic heft as his government faces growing threats in the Amhara and Oromo regions (AC Vol 65 No 1, Reality catches up with gambler Abiy).
In Somalia, the UAE struggled to interpret the intricacies of clan politics and has been backing several ineffectual operators. UAE firms do better when they focus on a limited commercial agenda, even though they benefit from state support.
Today, the UAE is the fourth biggest investor in Africa – after China, the European Union and the US. For the last two years it has invested more than China in Africa.
Yet there are plenty of warnings and questions about a wave of Gulf States funding washing across Africa.
Africans, if not their governments, have learned hard lessons about the need for more transparency in contracting and implementing agreements.
Other new commercial entrants to Africa have not provided the hoped-for contrast with western or colonial-era companies. For example, China's commercial operations have often undermined Africa's workforce and damaged its environment. They have also generated debts that have become problematic for some states.
Modern Gulf companies have little experience in Africa. Local counterparts are asking whether they would bring in their own staff and equipment or subcontract to other firms that may disrespect commitments as a means to boost short-term profits.
Some companies question the ability of Gulf companies to act quickly on the ground. Saudi Arabia's state apparatus is a Kafkaesque bureaucracy that MBS still needs to reform. Despite its technocratic rhetoric, the UAE often subcontracts to companies when it needs greater expertise.
The sheer volume of investment that the Gulf States are bringing to Africa can change financial dynamics across the continent. Much less clear is whether it will be used to generate sustainable growth and make the countries' economic structures more productive. Source: Africa Confidential
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