By ABDI HALIM M. MUSA

In the heart of Somaliland, a nation once known for its resilience and unity, stands a leadership plagued by division, conflict, and a disregard for the well-being of its people. President Muse Behi, at the helm of the Kulmiye Party, has presided over a turbulent era marked by escalating tensions, failed governance, and a loss of control over regions like Sool and Sanaag. As the upcoming presidential election looms on November 13, 2024, it is crucial for voters to reflect on the impact of Behi's rule and consider the future of their nation.

One of the primary reasons for the failure of Bihi's administration lies in the lack of strategic governance. The inability to effectively manage and control territories like Las Anod and parts of Sool and Eastern Sanaag has exposed a significant governance gap, leading to unrest and instability in these regions and ultimately formed their own separate autonomy.

The mismanagement of resources under Bihi's leadership has further exacerbated the challenges faced by Somaliland. The failure to allocate resources efficiently and effectively has hindered the development and progress of the region, contributing to discontent among the populace.

The escalating unrest and discontent within Somaliland, especially in areas like Sool, Togdheer, Awdal, and Sanaag, are a direct result of the administration's failure to address the grievances of the population. The lack of inclusive governance and meaningful dialogue has fuelled tensions and undermined stability in the region.

The security concerns arising from the mismanagement of territories pose a significant threat to the overall stability of Somaliland. The failure to assert control and address security challenges has heightened the risk of conflict and further destabilization.

Bihi's administration has witnessed a gradual erosion of public trust due to perceived failures in governance and leadership. The inability to deliver on promises and effectively address pressing issues has weakened the confidence of the populace in the government.

The ineffective implementation of policies and strategies under Bihi's leadership has hindered the progress and development of Somaliland. The lack of coherent and sustainable policies has impeded growth and prosperity, leading to widespread disillusionment among the population.

The communication failures of the administration in addressing the concerns of the populace have further exacerbated the challenges faced by Somaliland. The lack of transparency and accountability has fuelled mistrust and hindered effective governance.

The economic instability resulting from the mismanagement of resources and lack of strategic planning has had far-reaching consequences for Somaliland. The failure to

stimulate economic growth and create opportunities has perpetuated poverty and hindered prosperity in the region.

The administration's handling of human rights concerns, especially in conflict-affected areas, has been a point of contention. Between December 2017 and December 2018, 28 journalists were arrested, although only 10 were prosecuted, and all those detained were ultimately released.

The failure to uphold human rights principles and protect vulnerable population has raised alarms among international observers and human rights organizations. The escalation and failures of Bihi's administration have had implications for Somaliland's

international reputation. The inability to address internal challenges and conflicts has tarnished the region's image on the global stage, undermining efforts towards recognition and legitimacy.

Tensions in Borama, Awdal Region, highlight growing discontent against Muse Behi's government. Mohamed Abib, an MP from Awdal, faced government efforts to strip his

parliamentary immunity due to his remarks on justice and representation. His supporters in Borama, chanting “Down with Muse,” protested vigorously, reflecting also with deep-seated grievances and calls for justice after the death of Commander Aynanshe and other local issues. The strong support for Abib underscores the broader regional dissatisfaction with the Behi's government actions and policies.

The Bihi administration's struggles extend beyond LasAnod, with a notable inability to address the recurring conflicts in the Togdheer region. Clan tensions have resurfaced,exacerbated by government inaction. The recent violence in the Ali Sahid area highlights the dire consequences of neglecting these deeply rooted conflicts. While scholars and clan leaders have managed to mediate and restore peace temporarily, the underlying issues remain unaddressed, leaving the potential for future unrest simmering just beneath the surface if not resolved the root causes.  

Similarly, the Sanaag region has witnessed an uptick in localized skirmishes, as the administration's inability to address underlying grievances has allowed these simmering

disputes to boil over. The lack of a comprehensive conflict resolution strategy has exacerbated the situation, leaving communities vulnerable and distrustful of the

government's capacity to maintain peace and security.

The perception of favouritism and nepotism in resource allocation has further complicated the landscape of governance under Behi. The accusations of selective treatment and inequitable development have only served to deepen societal divisions, fostering resentment among vulnerable communities.

This favouritism undermines the very principles of democracy and equity, leaving many feeling disenfranchised and disillusioned. In a nation built on the pillars of unity and cooperation, the lack of fair representation is a dangerous precedent that could threaten the social cohesion necessary for progress.

Moreover, the economic instability and high inflation rates that have persisted under Bihi's leadership have disproportionately impacted the livelihoods of communities in the conflict-affected areas. The inability to provide basic services and economic opportunities has exacerbated the grievances and sense of abandonment felt by these populations, further undermining the government's legitimacy.  

The Behi administration has been criticized for the mounting casualties and injuries sustained by the Somaliland armed forces, particularly in the context of the escalating

conflict in Lasanod and the broader regional tensions. Under Behi's presidency, Somaliland has reportedly lost control over most parts of Sool and Sanaag regions, now in the hands of other entities, signalling a worrying trend of territorial losses.

The Behi government has been accused of fostering an environment of injustice, discrimination, and nepotism, which has eroded public trust and confidence in the

administration. The Behi administration faces growing criticism regarding pervasive corruption and a lack of accountability within government agencies. 

 The failure to uphold ethical standards erodes public trust and perpetuates a culture of impunity. When citizens perceive their leaders as self-serving rather than public servants, the foundations of governance begin to crumble, leading to a disenchanted populace reluctant to engage with the political process.

This corruption not only hampers development but also poses a significant barrier to achieving the transparency and accountability that the people of Somaliland deserve.

The lack of economic opportunities and the bleak prospects for young people in Somaliland have contributed to a growing sense of disillusionment with Behi's leadership.

The failure to address the persistent high inflation rates has had a detrimental impact on the living standards of the most vulnerable segments of the Somaliland population.

The Behi administration's inability to effectively navigate Somaliland's external relations and maintain positive diplomatic ties has undermined the country's standing on the global stage.

The economic stagnation and the prospect of financial collapse under Behi's tenure represent a stark contrast to the relative prosperity and growth seen under previous

administrations. The failure of the Kulmiye Party, led by Behi, to deliver on its political program promises has eroded public confidence and trust in the ruling party.

The Behi administration's handling of regional and clan-based conflicts has contributed to the deepening of societal divisions and fragmentation within Somaliland.

The president's actions have been accused of stoking political conflicts that have brought the country to the brink of a potential disintegration. Allegations of mismanagement and improper land transactions, including the auctioning of public lands, have further fuelled public discontent.

The Behi administration's perceived contempt for the rule of law and its failure to ensure accountability have undermined the foundations of Somaliland's democratic institutions.

The upcoming November 2024 presidential election in Somaliland presents a critical juncture for the country, as voters will have the opportunity to chart a new course and reject the continued rule of President Behi. 

The path forward requires a renewed commitment to inclusive governance, conflict resolution, and equitable development that can heal the divisions and restore the unity that has long been the cornerstone of Somaliland's progress.

As Somaliland approaches this pivotal moment, the electorate must evaluate the Bihi administration's record and determine whether a change in leadership is necessary to

address the multitude of challenges facing the nation. The call to action is clear: reject the continuation of Behi's brutal system of governance, vote against his re-election, and pave the way for a new chapter of hope, stability, and progress.

Together, we have the power to shape our nation's destiny. Let us choose unity over division, hope over despair, and progress over stagnation. The time for change is now, and the future of Somaliland lies in the hands of its people. Opinion remains the writers

Uganda on Friday announced the detection of two cases of mpox imported from the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the western district of Kasese, Xinhua reports.

ALSO READ: Rwanda ‘well-prepared’ to handle mpox outbreak, says health official

The cases were among six suspected infections in Mpondwe and Bwera, towns bordering the DRC, according to Henry Mwebesa, director general of Health Services at Uganda's Ministry of Health, in a statement issued in Ugandan capital Kampala.

He said samples from a 37-year-old Ugandan woman married to a Congolese national and a 22-year-old Congolese female tested positive for the viral disease.

ALSO READ: Mpox: Communal vigilance is our best defence

"Findings reveal that transmission did not take place in Uganda and to date, no secondary transmission has been linked to the two cases," said Mwebesa.

"So far, nine contacts are under follow-up. Uganda continues to monitor the evolving situation in the DRC where cases have been reported in nearly all provinces, the latest being North Kivu, specifically Goma," he said while confirming the deployment of a rapid response team to Kasese to collaborate with district authorities in controlling the imported cases.

The East African Community (EAC) issued an alert Monday, urging its eight member states to educate citizens on protecting themselves and preventing the spread of mpox.

ALSO READ: New mpox strain in DR Congo 'most dangerous yet' – reports

This followed reports from the World Health Organisation (WHO) warning of mpox outbreaks in Burundi and the DRC, both EAC members.

Meanwhile, Kenya's Ministry of Health declared a case of mpox Wednesday following its detection in Taita Taveta, southeast of the country's capital of Nairobi. 

Mpox, also known as monkeypox, transmits through close contact with infected animals or humans, contaminated objects, and respiratory droplets, causing symptoms including skin rash, fever, intense headache, muscle aches, back pain, weakness, and swollen lymph nodes, as per WHO guidelines. The New Times

The Arab League strongly condemned the attack that targeted a beach in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, which resulted in dozens of deaths and injuries.

Secretary-General of the Arab League, Ahmed Aboul Gheit said in a statement on Sunday, that, through this attack, the armed groups aim to weaken the federal government in Somalia and spread terror among civilians.

Aboul Gheit stressed the Arab League's consistent solidarity with Somalia in combating any threats to its security and stability, or works to undermine the progress achieved by the Somali government at all levels.

An armed group from the Somali Al-Shabaab movement, loyal to Al-Qaeda, resulted in a number of deaths and injuries yesterday after attacking Lido Beach in the Abdalaziz district of the capital, Mogadishu. 

“How do you create ideas that the crowd grabs on to, makes stronger, and helps spread?” (Timms & Heimans, 2018).

The above question resonates profoundly in the context of Kenya’s Gen Z and Millennials, who have emerged from political obscurity to catalyze transformative change. Who could have anticipated that a simple tweet, #RejectTheFinanceBill2024, would open floodgates of protest, reminiscent of the #NoReformsNoElections clarion call of 1997? 

This new generation has demanded radical transparency and accountability, literally shouting from rooftops that: Kenya must eradicate corruption; the ruling elite must honor their commitments; faith leaders must protect their followers from political opportunists; “the swamp must be drained”; and, strict adherence to the 2010 constitution is imperative.

Since independence, Kenya has sidestepped addressing the systemic generational marginalization and disempowerment of its youth, who constitute 75 per cent of the population under 35. The annual influx of 500,000 to 800,000 young people into the job market exacerbates this national crisis, with Gen Z bearing the brunt of unemployment and underemployment. 

In 2016, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated that unemployment among those aged 15-24 was 22 per cent. A 2018 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) report indicated that 9 out of 10 unemployed Kenyans were 35 years and below. By 2023, youth unemployment for the 15-24 age group was estimated at over 12 per 

Since 2013, Kenya has faced a high cost of living, especially concerning basic needs. According to protesting youth, this grim reality was worsened by the Finance Bill, 2024 taxation measures. Other grievances, such as the substitution of the costly Social Health Insurance Fund (SHIF) with NHIF and Linda Mama, the imposition of a housing levy, university fees hike, CDF unconstitutionality, and public debt opaqueness and various unilateral executive decisions, further fueled the June demonstrations.

The current self-organization of the youth as a “leaderless, tribeless, and fearless” movement can also be historically attributed to the government’s inability to advance the youth agenda, particularly after the 2007/8 election violence. 

Despite legislative efforts, such as the National Youth Policy of 2007 and the National Youth Council Act of 2009, meaningful youth responsive action was delayed. Elections under the National Youth Council Election Guidelines of 2011 were conducted from sub-location, location, division, district and provincial levels. However, the government hesitated to create democratic space for youth by establishing full-fledged National Youth Council and the Advisory Board.

In 2021, new regulations for the National Youth Council were introduced, establishing the National Youth Congress at ward and constituency levels in line with devolution. In Kenya’s 1,450 wards, six delegates elected by youth registered voters became part of 8,700 ward delegates, who then elected 580 constituency delegates. Unfortunately, the regulations mandated that these delegates act as volunteers without the mandate to form branches. Once more, the government missed an opportunity to launch an inclusive youth organizational framework from grassroots to national level. 

Despite the revamped Kenya Youth Development Policy of 2019 and various youth programs like the Youth Enterprise Development Fund, Uwezo Fund, Kazi Kwa Vijana; National Youth Service; Access to Government Procurement Opportunities (AGPO) etc., their skewed implementation has not induced a pragmatic youth Marshall Plan for employment, entrepreneurship and other opportunities. Counties, too, neglect prioritizing a transformative youth agenda.

In mid-2024, a disillusioned Gen Z took ownership of the youth vision, advocating for a clean government that equitably serves all citizens. They self-organized in novel and disruptive ways, raising and answering for themselves the question: Can a genuinely leaderless movement exist?

Leaderless revolutions

Let’s examine insights from three leading authorities on leaderless revolutions and new power paradigms. In The Leaderless Revolution: How Ordinary People Will Take Power and Change Politics in the 21st Century (2011), Carnes Ross argues that as governmental authority declines, people must embody their political beliefs in every action they commit to. He posits that individuals must negotiate directly with one another, enabling collective decision-making for better, fairer, and more enduring solutions.

Henry Timms and Jeremy Heimans, in New Power: How It’s Changing the 21st Century – and Why You Need to Know (2018), describe two power variants: old power, which is closed, leader-driven, and hoarded, and new power, which is open, participatory, and peer-driven. New power is most forceful when it surges, aiming not to hoard but to channel it.

The above authors reinforce the notion that new peoples’ power is midwifed through collaborative, servant type, and distributed forms of leadership. Kenya’s #RejectTheFinanceBill2024 and the subsequent Occupy Movement have conceivably drawn inspiration from such philosophy. And so have global movements such as Occupy Wall Street, GivingTuesday, MeToo, BlackLivesMatter and the Arab Spring.

Three factors may have triggered the Gen Z uprising: Robbie Gituhu’s self-immolation protesting the high cost of living, Mercy Tarus exposure of a study-abroad scam, and burdensome taxation introduced by the Finance Bill, 2023. The proximate cause, as mentioned before, was the Finance Bill, 2024, which initiated severe punitive tax measures. Although the Gen Z movement remains leaderless, it is not rudderless, with volunteers providing functional leadership for specific activities. Each participant contributes their agency within a ‘do-it-ourselves’ mindset.

Ruto acts

Clearly, any group, be it of the youth, human rights activists, independent media, influencers, social media practitioners of any hue, musicians, IT gurus or novices, diaspora citizens, sympathizers, Generation Alpha, etc., can lurch onto any movement activity to provide temporary leadership for example to offer pro bono legal services, free medical camps, organise a concert, visit the sick, attend funerals, M-Changa fund raise etc. After closure of an activity, the volunteer hangs her or his boots. Hence Gen Zs are faithful to the continuum of crowdsourcing change-making ideas, crowdfunding and crowdbuilding. This means searching for the Gen Z leader as traditionally understood can be frustrating. If any volunteer deviates and claims to be an overall leader, he or she “gets cancelled i.e. anasalimiwa.”

From June 18, 2024, Gen Z, armed with mobile phones (social media artillery), the Kenyan flag (Gen Z have bestowed renewed dignity to the Kenyan flag), and water bottles, took to the streets to protest against taxation without representation and development. The protests evolved into #OccupyParliament and #OccupyStateHouse, with the most significant demonstration occurring on June 25, 2024, when protestors stormed the Kenya National Assembly calling for its dissolution. The peaceful protests resulted in over 60 deaths and significant property loss.

In response to the protests, the president vetoed the Finance Bill, 2024, but signed the Appropriation Bill, 2024, and proposed budget cuts and new loans to address the tax deficit. The president dismissed 21 cabinet members and the Attorney General. However, the inclusion in government of ODM members and the recycling of some previous cabinet secretaries confirmed the Executive’s determination to consolidate power.

The Gen Z movement continues to grapple with several challenges. Will it at some future time transform itself into a political party, or join a progressive coalition, or grow as a movement with its unique political expression? Can the movement foster a group of ethical leaders by 2027, or will it remain a mere critic of government? What should the movement do to avoid loss of steam and decline? Only time and the Gen Z resolve will answer these questions.

In most X spaces, Gen Z and their supporters prioritize countrywide civic education, especially for rural youth and older generations, who are often swayed through political handouts and ethnic-based politics. The movement is also focusing on ensuring every youth has identity and voter cards by 2027 and is ready to vote and protect the ballot. The Gen Z are partnering with the Kenyan diaspora to help secure their voting rights. Although the uprising started as a Gen Z baby, the need to broaden the movement to Gen Z-Ote is under discussion.

As the spirit of Kenya’s Gen Z movement potentially spills over to other African countries, it is clear that the continent’s leaders must genuinely engage their youth. Both the African Youth Charter and the African Human and Peoples’ Rights provisions on youth empowerment must be vigorously enforced. In conclusion, the youth of Kenya are brewing new wine, while the president wants to contain it into old wine skins. Something is going to burst.

The Gen Z DNA is crowd leadership, emphasizing citizen sovereign power to impact government, all public institutions and society in general. The youth bulge is an asset, not a liability. The 21st century will become Africa’s century when the continent mobilizes her youth for sustainable development. By Kivutha Kibwana, The Standard