Violent protests broke out last week in South Sudan after videos on social media showed South Sudanese nationals who were killed in Sudan’s Al-Jazira state. 

Police in South Sudan said Wednesday that 600 people who had been detained for violent protests and looting of businesses have escaped from a military detention facility in the capital Juba.

Police spokesperson Col. John Kassara Koang Nhial said military police shot in the air while pursuing the escapees and managed to re-arrest 410 people, according to a report by the local Radio Tamazuj website. Police are searching for the remaining escapees.

Last week, violent protests broke out in South Sudan after gruesome videos circulated on social media showing South Sudanese nationals that were killed in Wad Madani, the capital of Al-Jazira state..

Many South Sudanese nationals are said to be stranded in war-torn neighboring Sudan, and the videos ignited their urge to retaliate by attacking Sudanese nationals residing in their country.

Police confirmed Monday that 16 Sudanese nationals were killed in the protests while several of their businesses were either vandalized or looted.

The government announced a nationwide curfew last week from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. local time to curb looting and violence.

Police said they have so far rescued 2,990 Sudanese nationals, who are currently seeking shelter and protection at police stations across Juba.

South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir has urged calm and an end to alleged atrocities against South Sudanese civilians. He called on the people to refrain from retaliation. Anadolu Agency

Fear of job cuts has gripped the education sector after the government announced a plan to merge and shut some institutions.

The plan is part of changes proposed by the Cabinet on Tuesday evening as part of government plans to streamline operations by merging and closing institutions with overlapping mandates.

The government’s plan will see 42 institutions with overlapping functions folded into 20. Additionally, 16 outdated institutions will be closed, with their mandates handed over to the private sector. 

Nine other institutions will have their responsibilities transferred to relevant ministries. The proposed changes now seek to merge the University Funding Board (UFB) and the Higher Education Loans Board (HELB) into one entity, amid a university funding crisis that has seen the institutions go five months without funding. 

The two institutions are among 42 the government has earmarked to have overlapping mandates and will now be reduced to 20.

HELB and UFB are responsible for funding students in universities; the former offering loans to the students and UFB offering scholarships under the new funding model and grants under the Differentiated Unit Cost or the old funding model.

Also proposed is the merger of the Commission for University, Kenya National Qualification Authority (KNQA) and Technical and Vocational Education Training Authority (TVETA) will also be merged into a single entity. 

These will form a single regulatory body overseeing higher education, technical training, and qualifications. This means student funding will be drawn from one pool.

However, the changes by Cabinet have seen some stakeholders develop cold feet as they fear job losses and layoffs. 

Commission for University Education (CUE) chairman Chacha Nyaigoti argues that the process might lead to right-sizing or downsizing which could see job losses in the institutions.

He noted that the review and restructure of institutions is normal practice to align organisations with current needs. “Historically, major corporations and companies have had to downsize, or right size, it is important that a working system gets reviewed from time to time for purposes of ensuring the functions are undertaken effectively and efficiently,” Nyaigoti told The Standard.

University and Academic Staff Union (UASU) organising secretary, Onsesmus Maluki warned that the job losses are real in the case of a merger. 

However, Maluki said he hopes the proposed merger, specifically for the UFB and HELB, will iron out the funding challenges facing universities.

“We hope that the proposed merger will not disadvantage universities, we hope that the two institutions(UFB and CUE) being under one roof will enhance efficacy and moving forward we will see timely disbursement of funds and that they will be able to deal with the issue of underfunding,” Maluki said on phone.

Further radical changes will see the dissolution of the Centre for Mathematics, Science, Technology, Education in Africa (CEMASTEA), the Kenya National Commission for UNESCO and the National Council for Nomadic Education to make them departments under the ministry of education.

Institutions such as the Jomo Kenyatta Foundation (JKF) and the School Equipment Production Unit (SEPU) are also slated for closure, having been deemed outdated.

Professional bodies such as the Nursing Council of Kenya will be delisted as state corporations, with the government ceasing their public funding. 

Daniel Mugendi, the Vice Chancellor’s Committee chairman called on the government to regulate the professional bodies to protect universities from increase in cost of mounting programmes and annual fees the institutions pay to the regulatory bodies.

“Cutting funding to the institutions might have the ripple effect forcing this institutions to increase fees for the institutions to cater for the shortfall, universities and even colleges must be protected from this,” Mugendi said.

The merger of UFB and HELB mirrors a recommendation by the Presidential Working Party on Education Reforms, which proposed creating a unified Tertiary Education Placement and Funding Board. By Lewis Nyaundi, The Standard

Humanitarians conducted a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder shock analysis that determined that there are 9.1 million Somalis affected by the humanitarian crisis. 47 per cent of the country’s population are affected by conflict, floods, drought, disease outbreaks (AWD/Cholera, measles) and displacement that disrupt lives and livelihoods, resulting in humanitarian needs. For each of these five shocks, a timeline and thresholds were defined, in line with the IASC Guidance, to accurately capture their current impact on the humanitarian situation.

Floods and droughts increasingly alternate in Somalia, with severe repercussions on agriculture and livestock that are essential for livelihoods and food security. Somalis are still recovering from the impact of the 2020 to 2023 historic drought and flooding in late 2023 and mid-2024, yet the country may be again moving towards another multi-season drought period. Recurrent climate shocks take place against the backdrop of decades of conflict, development deficits, widespread poverty and governance challenges, that have eroded coping capacities, increased humanitarian aid dependency and undermine resilience. The impact of shortened cycles between climate extremes will be amplified by climate change, with rising temperatures and erratic rainfall bound to increase water scarcity and heat mortality, reduce agricultural productivity and intensify flood risks by 2030.

The Gu (April to May) rains caused ooding that affected 268,000 people and displaced 81,000 people between mid-April and mid-May 2024. Despite a staggered onset and early cessation (usually from April to June), rains caused flooding across 13 districts, particularly in Hirshabelle, South West, Jubaland, and Puntland States.

Floods hit riverine communities along the Shabelle River particularly hard, with displacements in Belet Weyne accounting for more than 50 per cent of total displacements. Although the impact was lower than had been anticipated by humanitarians (see HNRP 2024), heavy rains and flash floods caused loss of livelihoods and damaged infrastructure including roads, schools, and shelter. Despite improved soil moisture and recharged water sources (surface and ground water sources), poor spatial/geographic distribution of rains, inundation of agricultural land, and conflict resulted in below-average Gu harvest in July.

The destruction of water sources and latrines exacerbated cholera outbreak. Somalia has an uninterrupted Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD) /cholera transmission since 2017, linked to poor water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) and health infrastructure, funding gaps, and seasonal flooding. In 2024, cumulative AWD/Cholera cases surpassed 2023 levels due to limited access to safe water, proper sanitation, and primary health services. As of November 2024, more than 19,800 cases were reported, compared to 18,304 cumulative cases of 2023 (Jan-Dec). Sites for displaced people and children under age 5, were particularly exposed to outbreaks, as high levels of acute malnutrition lower immunity to cholera infections.

During October and November 2024, southern and central Somalia received only 30 to 45 per cent of average cumulative rainfall. Reduced rainfall during the Deyr season (October to December), linked to La Niña conditions decreased local food production and availability. Drier-than-usual conditions, expected to persist into 2025, particularly impact northeastern, central and southern Somalia and risk stalling or reversing improvements in food security and livestock recovery. Some 4.4 million people are facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC phase 3) and emergency levels (IPC phase 4) between October and December 2024, with approximately 1.6 million children under age 5 facing acute malnutrition between August 2024 and July 2025.

An estimated 3.5 million people in Somalia are displaced, tied to climatic shocks and conict. While still high with 477,000 people internally displaced between January and November 2024, new internal displacements dropped by 85 per cent from their 2023 record level. In 2024, only 29 per cent of internal displacements were linked to climatic factors, whereas this proportion was 75 per cent in 2023.

Conict was the main driver of new internal displacements in 2024, accounting for 53 per cent of 477,000 displacements between January and November 2024. Most people who were forced to flee their homes remained within the same region. The districts most affected by conflict-related internal displacement were Luuq (Gedo), Diinsoor (Bay), Xarardheere (Muduq), Jamaame (Lower Juba), and Buuhoodle (Togdheer); largely related to escalating inter-clan fighting.

Inter-clan fighting spiked in multiple regions in 2024, notably in Galgaduud, Mudug, Gedo and Togdheer regions. Clashes between clans erupted in Luuq in July over land ownership disputes, displacing 42,000 people in July and 30,000 people in October, including those previously affected or recently returned. Sub-clans of the Dhulbahante and Isaaq clans clashed in Buuhoodle in November, displacing 26,000 people. As opposed to flood-linked displacements that tend to be temporary, conflict can often lead to protracted displacements, as concerns for safety, and damage to infrastructure and livelihoods prevent people from returning to their homes.

Forced evictions continue to pose a challenge in Somalia, affecting 154,000 internally displaced people by November 2024. Approximately 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), out of 3.5 million, live in the urban centres of Banadir (Daynille, Kahda), Bay (Baidoa), and Wogooyi Galbeed (Hargeisa), which account for 93 per cent of all forced evictions. Prospects of livelihoods, basic services, as well as humanitarian assistance “pull” displaced people into urban centres, contributing to Somalia’s rapid urbanization and rising land and housing prices. In spaces with high population density, displaced people often live on private land and without formal tenure agreements, increasing the risk of forced evictions.

Conict and insecurity take a heavy toll on civilians. The military offensive by Government and allied forces against non-State armed actors, notably Al-Shabaab, continued in 2024, although with reduced intensity compared to 2022-23. Between January and September, 854 civilian casualties were recorded (295 killed, 559 injured) a 35 per cent decrease from close to 1,300 casualties in 2023. A total of 1,636 grave violations against children were verified, with the majority of those affected being boys, (71 per cent), while 26 attacks against schools and hospitals were reported in the same period. Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) remains a critical concern, including gang rape and trafficking of girls for forced marriages to Al-Shabaab members.

Humanitarians are confronted with a challenging operating environment, marked by protracted conict. At least 67 incidents of violence against humanitarian personnel or assets were recorded throughout 2024. Complex, localized security dynamics rendered Jubaland and South West States particularly volatile for humanitarians. In the first quarter of 2024, three humanitarians were abducted and later released, while in the third quarter, three others were killed, amid violent clan dynamics. Heavy or very heavy access restrictions render an estimated 3.7 million people (19 per cent of the population, equal to 28 per cent of the total people in need [PiN]) hard-toreach for humanitarians

The African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) replaces the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) in January 2025, potentially resulting in shifting patterns of security, with a reduced footprint and a reduction in force strength. However, as of early December, contributions to funding and troops remain unclear, raising concerns about a smooth transition. Humanitarians have undertaken a thorough review of operating modalities to stay and deliver, including alternative escort provision and reviews of supply chains.

As a result, 5.98 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in 2025. The 13 per cent decrease in PiN, compared to 6.9 million in 2024, reflects the incorporation of scope setting in the needs analysis process, which extrapolates the people in need from the affected population instead of the entire population. This is helping to reinforce efforts of the humanitarian community in Somalia to move from status-based to vulnerability-based analysis. The 2024 HNRP considered 100 per cent of the displaced population (3.86 million people) to be in need, only 68 per cent of displaced people (or 2.4 million out of 3.5 million) are assessed to be in need in 2025. Improvements in drought conditions, decreases in internal displacement, and lower than anticipated Gu floods have all contributed to positive developments in the humanitarian situation.