During the South Sudan independence celebrations on 9 July 2011 at Freedom Square, next to the John Garang Mausoleum, the unity of purpose and hope for the future was electrifying. One could hardly imagine that the country would collapse into civil war only two years after independence, especially after a devastating 21-year war with the north. 

However, the country has been highly unstable and fractured since the civil war broke out in 2013. The semblance of peace that was brought about by the 2018 peace agreement is now threatened by the ongoing conflict in Upper Nile between the government forces and the White Army militia.  

The placing of Dr Riek Machar under house arrest by the same coalition government in which he is the second highest in command has added to the confusion.  

The country is at a crossroads due to many political, economic, cultural and ethnic factors that have prevented South Sudan from making positive steps and joining the community of nations since its independence in 2011.

In particular, the failure to implement the 2018 Peace Agreement (especially in terms of security sector reforms) and to bring about the unification of the various armed forces, and the lack of judicial reforms, are the immediate causes of the current crisis. 

On the one hand, the current conflict between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the White Army – a ragtag militia made up of Nuer youth – is threatening the 2017 cessation of hostilities agreement (CoHA) which, if abandoned, could push the country into a fresh all-out war. 

On the other hand, the fresh conflict is threatening to scatter the 2018 peace agreement, officially known as the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).

Already, Dr Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) has stated that his continued house arrest, and the plans to charge him with responsibility for the Upper Nile conflict, have “invalidated” the 2018 peace deal and risked plunging the country back into war. “With the arrest and detention of Dr Machar, the R-ARCSS has been abrogated,” stated Oyet Nathaniel Pierino, SPLM-IO deputy chairman. 

This would mean that the country could once again miss the timelines within which to enact a permanent constitution, carry out a national census, and resettle the over 2.3 million refugees living outside the country and the approximately 2 million internally displaced.

In this scenario, the prospects of the country holding credible and free elections in December 2026 remain a pipe dream. The country lacks a credible voter registry, electoral laws, and an independent electoral commission, free from the interests of the main political players. 

Just like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan is currently experiencing massive interference from neighbouring actors with economic, territorial and political interests.

Leading the pack is Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, who is always ready to unleash his Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) on any element fighting President Salva Kiir. UPDF intervened in 2013 and 2016 and is now engaged in the aerial bombardment of the White Army in Upper Nile. 

President Kiir’s critics often accuse Museveni of meddling in the internal affairs of South Sudan, falling short of calling him the de facto ruler. Sudan has also historically influenced various South Sudanese factions, and the ongoing conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia are currently facilitating the influx of illegal arms. 

In March, Juba authorities conceded that the war in Sudan has affected the activities of the joint border monitoring and verification mechanisms, allowing non-state actors to exploit the situation and turn porous border lines into hideouts and hubs for the smuggling of contraband or arms.

Joshua Craze, a writer and researcher with over a decade of experience in the affairs of South Sudan and Sudan, has painted some scary though not far-fetched scenarios. Craze argues that South Sudan faces the risk of being split into fiefdoms by neighbours with vested interests. He points out that the Sudanese rebels, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the UPDF are carving up parts of the country as enclaves for business ventures. 

Regional bodies like the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the international community, comprising key donors, have on numerous occasions demanded the complete execution of the 2018 peace agreement, but South Sudan’s political elites have mostly ignored these pleas.

Several papers have been written about what is ailing South Sudan, once perceived globally as a promising young nation with numerous resources to boot. It all boils down to the issue of bad governance in a country that rushed its independence before putting institutions in place and qualified people to run them. 

The institutions of governance and accountability are weak because of poor leadership, while the ruling party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), is working at cross purposes with the government. 

The problem goes deeper than the commonly cited political differences between President Kiir and Dr Machar or, in other words, the historical hatred between the two most populous ethnic groups – the Dinka and the Nuer. 

Prof Jeffrey Sachs, an American economist and public policy analyst, recently provided some useful insights into how the South Sudan secession in 2011 was the culmination of a well-calculated move by the US power mandarins to gain influence and have access to resources in the former greater Sudan.

Prof Sachs narrates that the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which allowed the south to secede, was not a result of South Sudan defeating North Sudan, but part of the US game of unipolar politics. He narrated how he would often travel to Nairobi to meet with the US military, senators or others with deep interests in the politics of Sudan. 

This chimes with the view held by those who were close to the late Dr John Garang that his decision to take to the bush in 1983 under the SPLA was not driven by the ambition to separate the Christian and animist south from the Arab-leaning north but, rather, to create a unified country free of ethnic, racial and religious discrimination.

On 28 September 2011, in an article published by the South Sudan News Agency, Elhaq Paul – a South Sudanese writer and commentator – sparked off a huge debate when he alleged that Dr Garang was not a separatist and therefore could not be the founding father and the hero of the independence of South Sudan. 

Paul’s argument that Dr Garang was an “avowed unionist” who had nothing to do with separation or the present image being concocted on his behalf sustained a heated debate for months. 

Dr Machar has been touting himself as the “founding father” of a separate South Sudan, thus claiming greater ownership of the country’s independence in July 2011. In an interview with this writer in Addis Ababa in March 2015, Dr Machar maintained that the SPLM split in 1991 – with him leading the Nasir faction and working with Khartoum – because of disagreements about what to fight for.

“While some, like Dr Garang, favoured a united and reformed Sudan, I advocated for the right to self-determination. Ultimately, my concept of self-determination emerged as the primary goal of the movement. As you can see, I have prevailed in the ideological dispute, and we are now independent.”

Those close to Dr Machar argue that the main problem is the desire by the majority Dinka ethnic group to dominate the other 63 communities politically and economically in what others call ethnic superiority of “Dinkocracy”.

But in the minds of President Kiir and his close allies – known as the “Jieng Council of Elders” – Dr Machar is a serial rebel, an incorrigible rebel with an undying ambition which, if not reigned in, will plunge the country into endless chaos.  

According to Mahmoud Akot, a South Sudanese political activist based in France, the placing of Dr Machar under house arrest is not merely a security measure – it is a declaration of intent by President Kiir to build a state devoid of opposition, democracy, or accountability.

Akot says that, by signing a peace agreement only to dismantle it systematically, President Kiir’s faction has demonstrated its inability to govern, preaching reconciliation while persecuting opposition leaders, and talking of elections while eliminating political competitors beforehand.

As the fighting in Upper Nile intensifies, South Sudan remains trapped in a cycle of political paralysis, weak governance, and external influence. Without major institutional reforms, credible elections by December 2026 remain highly doubtful, and the country risks another violent crisis. 

IGAD has been accused of failing to enforce the implementation of the R-ARCSS by not punishing those who violate the terms of the agreement due to internal dynamics and regional vested interests. 

However, Dr Ismail Wais, the IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan, maintains that the problem is not the 2018 agreement, but the lack of trust and political will that has led to a situation where the signatories are not focusing on the national good but on their own interests. 

Since its independence in 2011, South Sudan has struggled to establish a stable political and economic foundation. Several factors – internal, regional, and international – have contributed to the country’s ongoing instability and prevented it from making meaningful progress on governance, development, and international integration.

Some South Sudan watchers argue that the country’s economic crisis is both a root cause and a consequence of the perpetual conflict. Poverty, corruption, and mismanagement have created an environment in which violence is more profitable than peace for those in power.

John Andruga Duku, the former South Sudan Ambassador to China, subscribes to the view that the unfortunate trend of rewarding rebellion has created a situation where the country often faces the proliferation of rebellions because those who rebel are rewarded with cabinet posts or promotions within their military ranks.

According to Duku, politicians across the board are afraid of elections and feel safer under perennial extensions of the tradition. He maintains that politicians do not want to accede to the will of the people through an election because some of them operate briefcase political parties that stand no chance of winning constituency seats, let alone the presidency.

Yet, the country has reached a situation where the 2018 agreement that enabled the silencing of the guns after five years of brutal war is now on the verge of collapse. The agreement cannot be sustained without reforms in the security sector, which involve the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the armed groups. 

South Sudan is at a crossroads. Without security sector reforms, the political environment is not conducive to the holding of a credible election in December 2026, which in turn will mean continued power struggles and prolonged conflict.  By Fred Oluoch, The Elephant.