By JULIUS MBALUTO 

In a landmark move reinforcing the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) burgeoning role in Africa's digital transformation, Raxio Group today inaugurated its state-of-the-art data centre in Kinshasa, marking the country’s largest data centre, with Tier III accreditation by international industry body, the Uptime Institute.

Known as Raxio DRC1, the cutting-edge facility is backed by a $30 million investment, and represents a pivotal milestone in the nation’s Plan National du Numérique to drive digital inclusion, foster private sector growth, and transform public services through digitalisation.

Located in Limete on the southeast of Kinshasa, the two-storey Raxio Data Centre spans 1,542 square meters. Its modern design can house up to 400 racks and can reliably deliver 1.5MW of IT power to customer equipment. The 24/7 “always-on” facility is ideally located along key fibre routes, delivering best-in-class colocation and connectivity services. Multiple paths for power and cooling systems underpin the centre’s Tier III certification, while the usage of cutting edge components, guarantee unmatched levels of efficiency and a strong commitment to sustainability principles.

The project was completed in record time since breaking ground on construction in early 2023, a testament to Raxio’s proven track record of designing and constructing data centre facilities in Africa, and the support of government authorities in fast-tracking priority national projects.

“The inauguration of our Kinshasa data centre marks a significant achievement for Raxio and a pivotal moment for the DRC's digital landscape,” said Robert Mullins, CEO of Raxio Group. “DRC is one of Africa’s largest and fastest-growing markets with an existing latent demand for digital products and services that is forecast to soar in the coming years. With this facility, we are providing the critical infrastructure essential to supporting the digital economy and enhancing connectivity – and we expect to expand our presence in DRC through additional capacity and new facilities in years to come. Our investment reflects unwavering confidence in the DRC's immense potential and our commitment to sustainable digital development across Africa.”

With the widest footprint of any data centre provider on the continent, Raxio's strategy is to address the significant demand for high-quality data infrastructure across Africa. Since opening its first data centre in Uganda in 2021, Raxio has expanded this year into Ethiopia and Mozambique. The launch of the DRC marks the opening of Raxio’s fourth facility this year with 1.5MW being the group’s largest Day 1 capacity to date.

Pan-African digital backbone

Raxio continues to see strong momentum behind the roll-out of its pan-African digital backbone. Appetite for data centre capacity is growing not just amongst local enterprises and the public sector, but increasingly from some of the world’s largest hyperscale Cloud Service Providers, Content Delivery Networks and Mobile Network Operators as they strengthen their networks and market presence on the continent.

The DRC launch aligns with the government's Plan National du Numerique to make expansive digitalisation a catalyst for economic growth, competitiveness and social inclusion, while enabling a range of public and private sector cloud-based digital services. The Provision of data centres is one of the key pillars of the government plan, improving the digital landscape through reduced latency for real-time applications and providing a reliable backbone for mobile and internet connectivity. 

“Closing sub-Saharan Africa’s connectivity gap is no longer a pipe dream – it is happening now and we are extremely proud to be among the key enablers that are driving digital inclusion,” said Yannick Sukakumu, General Manager Raxio DRC. “The commitment and pragmatism of the government has been a key enabling factor in spurring our project from inception to completion in record time and stands as an inspiration for the wider region in grasping this incredible opportunity for a broad-based digital economy expansion. We are looking forward to welcoming customers into an international-standard data centre environment.”

Raxio Group is Africa’s leading carrier-neutral Tier III data centre operator. We are dedicated to delivering world-class co-location and connectivity services with a commitment to supporting Africa's digital transformation through the provision of state-of-the-art efficient, reliable and sustainable data infrastructure solutions that support and catalyse economic growth and digital inclusion across the continent. Raxio Group now has operational facilities in Uganda, Ethiopia Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and will soon be operational in Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, and Angola. We are constantly expanding our footprint and are on track to build several new facilities over the coming years, establishing a network of interconnected data centres servicing the active and latent demand across the African continent.

Journalists across Africa have been urged to re-strategise and embark on an in-depth and objective reporting on environmental and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) issues currently affecting the continent.

During a media engagement and training meeting held in Zambia, on promoting environmental and SRHR rights and justice, stakeholders recognized the critical role that journalists play in creating awareness and influencing public conversation and policies.  

Among the key issues discussed was the increased environmental and SRHR challenges and crisis that Africa is currently facing.
In recent years, Africa has been experiencing profound challenges including shifting weather patterns, rising temperatures, and frequent extreme events like floods and droughts, all of which are threatening the environment, livelihoods, socio-economic stability, and health risks particularly reproductive health.

Critical among the challenges identified was also the nexus between SRHR and environmental and climate change.
“We want to understand the connection between SRHR and environment because the two are greatly connected. We hope that by the end of this workshop we will be able to connect the both and report on the same,” emphasized Lester Lozari Phiri, SRHR Expert in Zambia. 

Climate change has direct implications for SRHR. According to the United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA), increase in air pollution and rising temperatures worsen maternal and neonatal health outcomes. For instance, an increase of one degree Celsius in the week before delivery corresponds to a six per cent greater likelihood of stillbirth.

Increase in poverty and food insecurity caused by loss of lives as a result of climate change is also having a significant impact on maternal health. This is because reduced yields affect the availability of highly nutritious foods which in turn results in poor nutrient take which is essential for mothers.

More notably, climate-related emergencies can severely disrupt access to supply network for essential commodities such as contraceptives and health services. The two-day conference, organized by Hivos, brought together journalists from Southern and Eastern Africa also emphasized on the need for journalists to learn and understand the science behind the environment and climate change, conservation measures, and SRHR. 

“We need to interpret and make it simple for our audience to understand these issues. We need to analyze them and understand that our opinions also matter,” said Roberta Mchangwe. Lecturer Media and Communications Studies at the University of Zambia. By Cynthia Atuo, People Daily

Parliament has approved Douglas Kanja’s nomination for Inspector General of the Police Service, even though he is 60 years old.

This decision bypasses the usual regulations that require public servants to retire at age 60 or 65 for those with disabilities.

President William Ruto had previously directed that public servants must retire at 60 as part of cost-cutting measures. Despite this, Kanja will serve a four-year term as allowed by law. 

In July, Ruto announced that there would be no extensions for public servants over 60. Nonetheless, Kanja, who graduated from Inoorero University in 2014, has been confirmed for the role despite being over the age limit. 

“They are directed to do this with no extensions to their tenure of service,” Ruto said when addressing the nation, at the peak of Gen Z demonstrations.

The nomination followed a vetting process by a joint parliamentary committee last week.

Both the National Assembly’s National Administration and Internal Security Committee and the Senate’s National Security Committee endorsed Kanja for the role. 

Kanja, who was nominated by Ruto, was serving as the acting IG following the resignation of Japheth Koome on July 12. As per the Constitution, Ruto’s nomination required parliamentary vetting.

Kanja began his career as a Police Constable in 1985 and has risen through the ranks to his current position. His previous roles include General Service Unit Commandant since 2018, Deputy Inspector General of the Kenya Police Service, Director of Criminal Investigations, and Commandant of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit. 

Sh46m net worth

During his vetting, Kanja declared a net worth of Sh46 million. He detailed his assets, including land, agricultural ventures, a house in Nairobi, and a rural home. He clarified that his Nairobi house is a bungalow located in the Kamiti area of Kiambu County.

The vetting was overseen by the National Assembly’s Departmental Committee on Administration and Internal Security and the Senate Standing Committee on National Security, Defence, and Foreign Relations. 

The process was co-chaired by Senator William Cheptumo of Baringo County and Narok West MP Gabriel Tongoyo.

“Members and Kenyans want to know your worth because you go to a big office with a big budget, and that’s when some people enrich themselves instead of serving the public,” said Mr Tongoyo.

During the vetting, Kanja addressed challenges within the police service and vowed to leverage technology to combat crime. He also promised to seek additional funding and improve the police communication team, which he criticised for poor information dissemination. Emphasizing the need for better training, Kanja acknowledged the issues affecting the police’s image and service delivery.

He highlighted that the National Police Service (NPS) receives only a fraction of its budget requests, with current allocations being about a third of what is needed. “We face serious budget constraints. If appointed, I will push for additional funding,” Kanja said, responding to concerns about police effectiveness amid austerity measures.

Senator Okong’o Omogeni urged Kanja to address the issue of police officers concealing their faces during arrests, which he argued violates the law.

“Why should the police hide their faces while making arrests? Are they criminals? Anyone arresting me should be identifiable, and I should have the right to notify my lawyer,” Omogeni said.

Kanja will face immediate challenges as Inspector-General, including persistent banditry, cattle rustling, extrajudicial killings, corruption, and conflicts of interest within the police force.

The nation will closely watch how he addresses issues such as porous borders, road accidents, police reforms, human trafficking, illicit brews, drug problems, failed community policing, and strained police-public relations. By Benjamin Imende, The Standard

The ambiguous and often tumultuous relations between Uganda and neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have made headlines in recent months. In a July 2024 report, the UN Group of Experts on the DRC stated that Ugandan army and intelligence officials were providing active support to the M23 rebel group.

The group, which is active in eastern DRC, was first defeated in 2013. But it has resumed hostilities in the vast area since 2021.

The UN report also found that Uganda was tolerating the group’s activities on its territory, with supplies and recruits coming through the country. M23’s key demands are an end to violence and discrimination against Congolese Tutsi, and a safe return to the DRC for its members.

Uganda has denied the claims of the UN report, calling them “laughable, baseless and illogical”. It wants to safeguard its relations with Kinshasa.

I have studied conflict and rebel movements in the DRC and Uganda for close to two decades. In my view, Uganda’s main interests in the DRC are economic, but these are closely connected with political and security interests. Understanding them is key to the conflict in the region.

1. Economic incentives

Central to understanding Uganda’s interests in eastern DRC is the second Congolese war (1998-2003).

The war broke out in 1998, after Rwanda helped bring Laurent-Desiré Kabila to power in the DRC in 1997. Uganda was one of the countries drawn in to the conflict. Rwanda’s and Uganda’s interest in natural resources, such as gold and timber, as well as the illicit regional trade in these goods, played an important role.

In 2022, the International Court of Justice ordered Uganda to pay the DRC US$325 million for looting gold, diamonds and timber during the war.

That has influenced the way Uganda is perceived by Congolese and international observers. These commodities remain important for Uganda.

A recent investigation, for example, documented the ongoing smuggling of Congolese timber to Uganda and other parts of east Africa. But it is gold which is particularly important. Uganda exports far more gold than it produces: in 2021, for example, it produced 2.9 tonnes and exported 30.2 tonnes.

It is widely accepted that most gold exported as Ugandan is smuggled from the DRC.

Since 2016, gold has been Uganda’s most important export product. The latest available data for the financial year of 2023 shows gold brings in US$2.7 billion in revenue, or 37% of Uganda’s export earnings.

The DRC is also important in another way for Uganda: as an export market. In June 2024, Uganda exported US$60 million more than it imported, with the DRC as its largest market.

2. Political interests

All of this has important political meaning for Uganda at national and regional levels.

First, the economic importance of the Congolese market has strong political significance for the Yoweri Museveni regime. The president has been in power for close to 40 years, and his basis of legitimacy is waning – particularly for the “Museveni babies”, the large proportion of the population born under his rule. They want public services and jobs.

The regime fears the prospect of youth protests. A taster of this was given in 2011 during “walk to work” protests. The recent Kenyan protests are a reminder of what can happen when economic stability is lacking.

The Congolese market is seen as key. It explains why Uganda is co-financing the construction of 223 kilometres of roads in eastern Congo. The project was launched in June 2021, and has been defended by Museveni as holding major economic benefits for Uganda. 

Second, access to the Congolese market underlies regional geopolitical tensions.

Rwanda has comparable economic interests in eastern DRC, particularly when it comes to gold. Similar to Uganda, Rwanda has little domestic gold production, but is a major exporter of the commodity: since 2016, gold has been its most important export product. Gold export earnings have risen to US$882 million in 2023 and it’s widely accepted that most is smuggled from the DRC.

Both Rwanda and Uganda have in recent years signed mining contracts in the DRC. These common interests are a source of regional geopolitical tensions. Studies have found that the re-emergence of M23 in November 2021 was a direct result of these tensions.

The expansion of Ugandan interests in eastern DRC – through the road works and the redeployment of Ugandan troops there in November 2021 – was seen as a direct threat to Rwandan interests in the area.

The more M23 expanded its zone of influence in eastern DRC throughout 2022 and 2023 – directly supported by Kigali – the more Kampala saw M23 as a threat to its interests. Or, to be more precise, an M23 which was solely under the influence of Rwanda.

Uganda has had fluctuating relations with Rwanda. The Museveni government was initially close with Rwandan president Paul Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. But they have had ups and downs.

Regional influence has been a major point of contention. In this context, Museveni cannot allow Kagame to have sole control over eastern DRC. And Kampala also wants to protect its economic interests in the area.

3. Security

Security is closely intertwined with economic interests.

A clear example of this is Operation Shujaa – Uganda’s military operation in eastern DRC. 

The operation, in collaboration with the Congolese army, was launched a month after a series of suicide attacks in October 2021 in Kampala by the Allied Democratic Forces rebel group. The group is active in the North Kivu and Ituri provinces of eastern DRC.

The Ugandan army wants to weaken the rebel group. At the same time, this military operation also serves economic functions: the road works in eastern DRC are explicitly part of the military operation.

The operation also intends to protect its oil infrastructure. Uganda has important oil deposits in its western region, which borders the DRC. This promised oil revenue is important for the Museveni regime.

The balancing act

In sum, Uganda has a multitude of related interests in eastern DRC. During periods of upheaval, such as the current M23 crisis, Uganda tries to protect these interests. This is a difficult balancing act.

M23’s presence in the region forces Kampala into action to protect its interests. Leaving eastern DRC or M23 only under the influence of Rwanda is seen as a threat to these interests. But Kampala doesn’t want to upset Kinshasa – it wants to keep its access to the Congolese market.

The recent findings of the UN Group of Experts report therefore suggest some kind of compromise. The report indicates largely passive support for M23, suggesting that Uganda is achieving some leverage over M23 while retaining relations with the DRC.

The crisis in eastern DRC cannot be understood in isolation. Neigbouring countries are involved in a variety of ways. Understanding, or solving, the conflict needs to involve these countries.

Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of Antwerp

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.