Egypt recently deepened its involvement in the war-weary Horn of Africa by arming Somalia and deploying its troops in the embattled country. To Ethiopia’s growing alarm, Egypt is also set to join the multinational force supporting the Somali army against the jihadist threat by al-Shabaab.

Egypt’s potentially destabilising presence in the region is seen a direct consequence of Ethiopia’s port agreement with breakaway Somaliland, which Somalia took as a direct affront.

Endalcachew Bayeh, a political scholar with a focus on the Horn of Africa, sets out the risks and the path to de-escalation.

What do we know about Egypt’s entry into Somalia and the theatre of conflict in the Horn?

Egypt’s arrival in the Horn of Africa can be traced back to Ethiopia’s quest for a dedicated port under its control. Ethiopia is the world’s largest landlocked country by population and has relied exclusively on the port of Djibouti since the outbreak of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war (1998-2000).

Ethiopia has been exploring alternative access points. This led to the announcement on 1 January 2024 that it had struck a port deal with Somaliland. Ethiopia agreed to recognise the breakaway republic in exchange for a naval base on Somaliland’s coast.

The announcement sparked a diplomatic rift with Somalia, which viewed the deal as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Somalia still considers self-declared Somaliland part of its territory.

Amid the turmoil, Somalia courted Egypt as a regional patron to counter Ethiopia. This aligned well with Egypt’s increasing interest in finding a military partner along Ethiopia’s border.

Egypt is a longstanding rival of Ethiopia. Recently, it threatened to go to war over Ethiopia’s massive Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which it sees as a threat to its survival.

Egypt deployed military forces in Somalia following its defence deal with Mogadishu in August 2024. It also plans to deploy 5,000 soldiers as part of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia. The mission is set to replace the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, in which Ethiopia is a main player.

Ethiopia’s agreement to recognise Somaliland and the friction with Somalia have brought its old enemy, Egypt, to its doorstep.

How have Egypt-Ethiopia hostilities added to regional tensions?

Soon after Egypt’s deployment in Somalia, Ethiopia formalised its recognition of Somaliland. It also sent an ambassador to the capital, Hargeisa. This made it the first nation to officially acknowledge Somaliland’s independence. The two are also rushing to turn their memorandum of understanding into a binding bilateral treaty.

Somaliland ordered the closure of the Egyptian Cultural Library in Hargeisa.

Eritrea, for a time a key ally of Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed in the fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, is now at odds with Addis Ababa. And, in response to the recent tensions in the region, Eritrea is strengthening its ties with Egypt and Somalia. A recent meeting of the three has created a united front against Ethiopia.

In Somalia, Ethiopia plays a stabilising role. Somalia now demands that Ethiopia should end its involvement. That could open the way for militant groups and keep Somalia unstable. This is even more likely to happen if Egypt focuses on its competition with Ethiopia rather than Somalia’s stability.

In addition, Somalis have longstanding territorial claims over parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Instability can create fertile ground for groups like Al-Shabaab, which aims to include these territories in an Islamic state.

Finally, tensions have risen between Djibouti and Somaliland over the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal. This is because the agreement will almost certainly be bad for Djibouti’s economy. Djibouti relies heavily on port revenues that are almost entirely generated from Ethiopia.

What are the risks for the region?

Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland and Egypt’s presence in Somalia come at a time of multiple regional crises. These include the strained Ethiopia-Eritrea relations, the Ethiopia-Sudan dispute over Al-Fashaga border region, and instability in Ethiopia.

This volatile environment increases the likelihood of proxy wars.

Key areas to watch are:

Sudan and Egypt: These two countries align on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam issue. Egypt has enhanced its security cooperation with Sudan through military support and joint exercises. Although Sudan is in turmoil, the Al-Fashaga dispute with Ethiopia remains a potential flashpoint. Egypt may take advantage of this dispute and its support for the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces to further its interests.

Instability in Ethiopia: In several regions, the government is engaged in active conflict with non-state forces. This instability creates fertile ground for Egypt to potentially support proxies against the Ethiopian government. Egypt and Somalia have already expressed the possibility of using proxy forces.

Egypt’s main motivation for intervening in the region is to control the Nile’s source or hinder Ethiopia’s use of the water. As a result, Ethiopia perceives Egypt’s presence at its doorstep as a direct security threat. This increases tensions between Egypt, Somalia and Ethiopia.

Any further destabilisation of Ethiopia would disrupt the entire region, as it shares porous borders with almost all countries in the Horn.

What are the potential avenues for de-escalation?

A promising pathway for reducing tensions in Somalia and the broader region is for the two regional powers to reconsider their strategies and exercise restraint.

Ethiopia can access the sea through Somaliland without formal recognition. This could ease tensions and would not encourage separatist movements.

For Egypt, a more constructive approach would be to limit its direct involvement in the Horn of Africa. Instead, it should address its concerns about the Ethiopian mega-dam through the United Nations, the African Union and other platforms. Historically, its unilateral actions have often been sources of tensions rather than solutions in the region.

The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development must ensure that the regional states themselves address regional issues. States must make wise decisions now to calm tensions, as no state will be spared from the spillover effects.

Written by Endalcachew Bayeh, Lecturer and Researcher, Bahir Dar University. 

Egypt recently deepened its involvement in the war-weary Horn of Africa by arming Somalia and deploying its troops in the embattled country. To Ethiopia’s growing alarm, Egypt is also set to join the multinational force supporting the Somali army against the jihadist threat by al-Shabaab.

Egypt’s potentially destabilising presence in the region is seen a direct consequence of Ethiopia’s port agreement with breakaway Somaliland, which Somalia took as a direct affront.

Endalcachew Bayeh, a political scholar with a focus on the Horn of Africa, sets out the risks and the path to de-escalation.

What do we know about Egypt’s entry into Somalia and the theatre of conflict in the Horn?

Egypt’s arrival in the Horn of Africa can be traced back to Ethiopia’s quest for a dedicated port under its control. Ethiopia is the world’s largest landlocked country by population and has relied exclusively on the port of Djibouti since the outbreak of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war (1998-2000).

Ethiopia has been exploring alternative access points. This led to the announcement on 1 January 2024 that it had struck a port deal with Somaliland. Ethiopia agreed to recognise the breakaway republic in exchange for a naval base on Somaliland’s coast.

The announcement sparked a diplomatic rift with Somalia, which viewed the deal as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Somalia still considers self-declared Somaliland part of its territory.

Amid the turmoil, Somalia courted Egypt as a regional patron to counter Ethiopia. This aligned well with Egypt’s increasing interest in finding a military partner along Ethiopia’s border.

Egypt is a longstanding rival of Ethiopia. Recently, it threatened to go to war over Ethiopia’s massive Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which it sees as a threat to its survival.

Egypt deployed military forces in Somalia following its defence deal with Mogadishu in August 2024. It also plans to deploy 5,000 soldiers as part of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia. The mission is set to replace the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, in which Ethiopia is a main player.

Ethiopia’s agreement to recognise Somaliland and the friction with Somalia have brought its old enemy, Egypt, to its doorstep.

How have Egypt-Ethiopia hostilities added to regional tensions?

Soon after Egypt’s deployment in Somalia, Ethiopia formalised its recognition of Somaliland. It also sent an ambassador to the capital, Hargeisa. This made it the first nation to officially acknowledge Somaliland’s independence. The two are also rushing to turn their memorandum of understanding into a binding bilateral treaty.

Somaliland ordered the closure of the Egyptian Cultural Library in Hargeisa.

Eritrea, for a time a key ally of Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed in the fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, is now at odds with Addis Ababa. And, in response to the recent tensions in the region, Eritrea is strengthening its ties with Egypt and Somalia. A recent meeting of the three has created a united front against Ethiopia.

In Somalia, Ethiopia plays a stabilising role. Somalia now demands that Ethiopia should end its involvement. That could open the way for militant groups and keep Somalia unstable. This is even more likely to happen if Egypt focuses on its competition with Ethiopia rather than Somalia’s stability.

In addition, Somalis have longstanding territorial claims over parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Instability can create fertile ground for groups like Al-Shabaab, which aims to include these territories in an Islamic state.

Finally, tensions have risen between Djibouti and Somaliland over the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal. This is because the agreement will almost certainly be bad for Djibouti’s economy. Djibouti relies heavily on port revenues that are almost entirely generated from Ethiopia.

What are the risks for the region?

Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland and Egypt’s presence in Somalia come at a time of multiple regional crises. These include the strained Ethiopia-Eritrea relations, the Ethiopia-Sudan dispute over Al-Fashaga border region, and instability in Ethiopia.

This volatile environment increases the likelihood of proxy wars.

Key areas to watch are:

Sudan and Egypt: These two countries align on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam issue. Egypt has enhanced its security cooperation with Sudan through military support and joint exercises. Although Sudan is in turmoil, the Al-Fashaga dispute with Ethiopia remains a potential flashpoint. Egypt may take advantage of this dispute and its support for the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces to further its interests.

Instability in Ethiopia: In several regions, the government is engaged in active conflict with non-state forces. This instability creates fertile ground for Egypt to potentially support proxies against the Ethiopian government. Egypt and Somalia have already expressed the possibility of using proxy forces.

Egypt’s main motivation for intervening in the region is to control the Nile’s source or hinder Ethiopia’s use of the water. As a result, Ethiopia perceives Egypt’s presence at its doorstep as a direct security threat. This increases tensions between Egypt, Somalia and Ethiopia.

Any further destabilisation of Ethiopia would disrupt the entire region, as it shares porous borders with almost all countries in the Horn.

What are the potential avenues for de-escalation?

A promising pathway for reducing tensions in Somalia and the broader region is for the two regional powers to reconsider their strategies and exercise restraint.

Ethiopia can access the sea through Somaliland without formal recognition. This could ease tensions and would not encourage separatist movements.

For Egypt, a more constructive approach would be to limit its direct involvement in the Horn of Africa. Instead, it should address its concerns about the Ethiopian mega-dam through the United Nations, the African Union and other platforms. Historically, its unilateral actions have often been sources of tensions rather than solutions in the region.

The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development must ensure that the regional states themselves address regional issues. States must make wise decisions now to calm tensions, as no state will be spared from the spillover effects.

Written by Endalcachew Bayeh, Lecturer and Researcher, Bahir Dar University. 

Egypt recently deepened its involvement in the war-weary Horn of Africa by arming Somalia and deploying its troops in the embattled country. To Ethiopia’s growing alarm, Egypt is also set to join the multinational force supporting the Somali army against the jihadist threat by al-Shabaab.

Egypt’s potentially destabilising presence in the region is seen a direct consequence of Ethiopia’s port agreement with breakaway Somaliland, which Somalia took as a direct affront.

Endalcachew Bayeh, a political scholar with a focus on the Horn of Africa, sets out the risks and the path to de-escalation.

What do we know about Egypt’s entry into Somalia and the theatre of conflict in the Horn?

Egypt’s arrival in the Horn of Africa can be traced back to Ethiopia’s quest for a dedicated port under its control. Ethiopia is the world’s largest landlocked country by population and has relied exclusively on the port of Djibouti since the outbreak of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war (1998-2000).

Ethiopia has been exploring alternative access points. This led to the announcement on 1 January 2024 that it had struck a port deal with Somaliland. Ethiopia agreed to recognise the breakaway republic in exchange for a naval base on Somaliland’s coast.

The announcement sparked a diplomatic rift with Somalia, which viewed the deal as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Somalia still considers self-declared Somaliland part of its territory.

Amid the turmoil, Somalia courted Egypt as a regional patron to counter Ethiopia. This aligned well with Egypt’s increasing interest in finding a military partner along Ethiopia’s border.

Egypt is a longstanding rival of Ethiopia. Recently, it threatened to go to war over Ethiopia’s massive Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which it sees as a threat to its survival.

Egypt deployed military forces in Somalia following its defence deal with Mogadishu in August 2024. It also plans to deploy 5,000 soldiers as part of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia. The mission is set to replace the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, in which Ethiopia is a main player.

Ethiopia’s agreement to recognise Somaliland and the friction with Somalia have brought its old enemy, Egypt, to its doorstep.

How have Egypt-Ethiopia hostilities added to regional tensions?

Soon after Egypt’s deployment in Somalia, Ethiopia formalised its recognition of Somaliland. It also sent an ambassador to the capital, Hargeisa. This made it the first nation to officially acknowledge Somaliland’s independence. The two are also rushing to turn their memorandum of understanding into a binding bilateral treaty.

Somaliland ordered the closure of the Egyptian Cultural Library in Hargeisa.

Eritrea, for a time a key ally of Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed in the fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, is now at odds with Addis Ababa. And, in response to the recent tensions in the region, Eritrea is strengthening its ties with Egypt and Somalia. A recent meeting of the three has created a united front against Ethiopia.

In Somalia, Ethiopia plays a stabilising role. Somalia now demands that Ethiopia should end its involvement. That could open the way for militant groups and keep Somalia unstable. This is even more likely to happen if Egypt focuses on its competition with Ethiopia rather than Somalia’s stability.

In addition, Somalis have longstanding territorial claims over parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Instability can create fertile ground for groups like Al-Shabaab, which aims to include these territories in an Islamic state.

Finally, tensions have risen between Djibouti and Somaliland over the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal. This is because the agreement will almost certainly be bad for Djibouti’s economy. Djibouti relies heavily on port revenues that are almost entirely generated from Ethiopia.

What are the risks for the region?

Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland and Egypt’s presence in Somalia come at a time of multiple regional crises. These include the strained Ethiopia-Eritrea relations, the Ethiopia-Sudan dispute over Al-Fashaga border region, and instability in Ethiopia.

This volatile environment increases the likelihood of proxy wars.

Key areas to watch are:

Sudan and Egypt: These two countries align on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam issue. Egypt has enhanced its security cooperation with Sudan through military support and joint exercises. Although Sudan is in turmoil, the Al-Fashaga dispute with Ethiopia remains a potential flashpoint. Egypt may take advantage of this dispute and its support for the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces to further its interests.

Instability in Ethiopia: In several regions, the government is engaged in active conflict with non-state forces. This instability creates fertile ground for Egypt to potentially support proxies against the Ethiopian government. Egypt and Somalia have already expressed the possibility of using proxy forces.

Egypt’s main motivation for intervening in the region is to control the Nile’s source or hinder Ethiopia’s use of the water. As a result, Ethiopia perceives Egypt’s presence at its doorstep as a direct security threat. This increases tensions between Egypt, Somalia and Ethiopia.

Any further destabilisation of Ethiopia would disrupt the entire region, as it shares porous borders with almost all countries in the Horn.

What are the potential avenues for de-escalation?

A promising pathway for reducing tensions in Somalia and the broader region is for the two regional powers to reconsider their strategies and exercise restraint.

Ethiopia can access the sea through Somaliland without formal recognition. This could ease tensions and would not encourage separatist movements.

For Egypt, a more constructive approach would be to limit its direct involvement in the Horn of Africa. Instead, it should address its concerns about the Ethiopian mega-dam through the United Nations, the African Union and other platforms. Historically, its unilateral actions have often been sources of tensions rather than solutions in the region.

The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development must ensure that the regional states themselves address regional issues. States must make wise decisions now to calm tensions, as no state will be spared from the spillover effects.

Written by Endalcachew Bayeh, Lecturer and Researcher, Bahir Dar University. Defence Web

October is globally devoted to raising awareness about dyslexia, a learning difficulty that primarily affects reading, writing, and spelling.

While dyslexia doesn’t affect intelligence, teachers unfamiliar with its complexities continue to label the affected children “stupid” or “slow learners” despite reports that these children are incredibly bright and creative, writes YUDAYA NANGONZI.

When Jordan Ssebuliba’s son started school, he was a normal child. He excelled in class with science and Social Studies as his best subjects. His son never struggled academically until primary four when teachers labelled him a slow learner. Teachers insisted the child was lazy and required extra lessons to cope with other learners. 

“This broke my heart because our son used to get good grades in lower primary. When he started declining in P4 and P5, teachers had no explanation for it,” Ssebuliba recalled.

He narrated his ordeal during the 2nd Dyslexia Awareness Day Celebrations held recently at Hill Preparatory School in Naguru. He resorted to paying teachers for extra lessons, but all in vain. At some point, he decided to beat the child, but it worsened the situation. His son became more irritated, and teachers showed less interest in improving his low grades even after multiple discussions with the parents. 

“I got more concerned when he got 12% in the English language yet is good at spoken English. I threatened him with more beating during one of the homework sessions. I excused myself from the dining table for about five minutes but upon return, he had scribbled in his homework book with a pen,” Ssebuliba recalled.

“This is a boy who feared me but he had no explanation for the scribbling.”

At this point, he interacted with several friends who led him to Dr Eria Paul Njuki, a specialist in Child Language and Language disability, Dyslexia, and Autism Testing and Tutoring Specialist, for a private assessment. Dr Njuki delivered what Ssebuliba called “unfortunate but fulfilling news” that his son had dyslexia and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) – a condition that affects one’s attention, ability to sit still, and self-control. 

“I have a child who can’t sit down. You almost have to tie him to a seat because he always has an excuse to stand up or refuse to do something,” he said.

Armed with the diagnosis, Ssebuliba returned home to reflect that the child was not only struggling academically but had other symptoms that came with dyslexia. At 11 years old, he couldn’t tie his shoelaces, tucked his shirt inside-out, and couldn’t perfectly button his shirts. He was advised to find his son a new learning environment that wouldn’t see him as stupid, but as a child with untapped potential.

LIFE AT NEW SCHOOL

Now in Primary Six at Hill Preparatory, an inclusive school in Naguru, Ssebuliba said the transformation so far is remarkable.

“My son who had scored 12% in English and 7% in Mathematics at his previous school had improved with 60% and 70% respectively. His best mark was 80% in Science. I looked at the teachers suspiciously thinking they were trying to impress me or they gave him free marks,” Ssebuliba said, adding that he posed similar questions to his son at home and gave correct responses. 

At the end of term two 2024 examinations, the child’s worst score was 67%.

“He can copy work from a blackboard to the book. If a normal learner can write 100 words in five minutes, our son could previously write only 16 words. The teachers [at the previous school] didn’t know this because he could not keep up with the first pace of other learners.”

The head of the Special Needs Education (SNE) department at Hill Preparatory School, Florence Nsangi, noted that learners with dyslexia can realize their full potential when assisted with friendly teaching strategies. She encouraged teachers to formulate better techniques to capture the attention of dyslexic learners. Given their low attention span, the learners easily get bored and hardly settle in the classroom.

“Be friendlier to children and don’t command them to do certain tasks. For instance, children with dyslexia are fond of interchanging letters; b for d, m for w,p for 9,u for n, among others. Instead of punishing them, come up with a riddle or song to correct them,” Nsangi said. 

Just like in UNEB examinations, she encouraged schools to frequently use professional transcribers during end-of-term examinations as dyslexic learners may not write correct answers but can verbally give responses to questions.

Commenting on the inadequacy of skilled teachers in special needs, the commissioner in charge of special needs education at the Education ministry, Sarah Bugoosi, said: “Government has ensured that SNE teachers are trained but we can’t claim that all is well in schools. With more advocacy, children with dyslexia will have a future.” She called for a census of dyslexic learners for better management and planning.

TRANSITION STILL A NIGHTMARE

Dr Njuki, also a person living with dyslexia and into advocacy for 37 years, said the transition of learners is still a nightmare due to limited knowledge about dyslexia by teachers.

“Parents are still stranded about the right schools for children as the repetition rates remain high. I have found 20-year-olds in primary and it demotivates the learners. On the other hand, the teachers are adamant on how to help them,” Njuki said.

Some learners may push through the primary level but high school dropouts are still being registered at the secondary level where teachers are less empowered in special needs education. Njuki is not only dyslexic but also has Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) – one of the comorbidities of Dyslexia. He is highly disorganized but works with assistive personnel – something he recommended to most parents whose children have severe dyslexia and ADHD. 

“If we do the right things, we can help many children reach their milestones. This condition gives someone a brain that functions differently but doesn’t take away one’s God-given intelligence,” Njuki said.

He, however, insisted that people hardly believe that dyslexia is a highly genetic condition. In children, Njuki explained that one must be
able to speak 10 to 15 words by one year as delayed speech is one of the early warning signs for dyslexia.

In adulthood, the symptoms are; slow readers, terrible spellers, difficulty putting thoughts on paper, failure to differentiate between right and left sides, often getting lost, and sometimes confusing letters b for d when tired or sick. Some dyslexic adults also have redundancy in speech and highly suffer word retrieval difficulties.

EARLY ASSESSMENT IS KEY

Njuki urged the government to prioritize early diagnosis and retooling teachers. Currently, Uganda has less than 10 specialists who can accurately diagnose dyslexia.

Initially, the education ministry had early assessment centers for special needs including dyslexia placed in 45 districts and supported by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). Then, yellow cars traversed the country assessing learners before they could start school. However, when DANIDA phased out, the program also closed.

According to Bugoosi, the ministry is now working towards revamping the assessment resource services. Plans are underway to court Kyambogo University to house the national assessment center linked to the district centers. To date, Uganda has one dyslexia assessment center based at Nakivubo Blue Primary School. Although the services are free, Njuki argued that the facility is limiting and inaccessible for parents out of Kampala.

The Inclusive Education Officer at KCCA, Idd Mubaraka, admitted that the center has some gaps.

“The center is open but operates with people who are not SNE teachers. Some personnel are clinical psychologists while others have varying backgrounds. They are still supporting us as volunteers who refer children to other specialists. If we can have more funding for the center, it would be a game changer for dyslexic children,” Mubaraka said.

Ssebuliba’s journey has taught him that the stigma is ingrained in most schools, leaving countless children struggling in silence with dyslexia. Despite having a child living with dyslexia and ADHD, he remains hopeful that his son’s future looks bright after a proper diagnosis.  By Yudaya Nangonzi, The Observer

First Lady Madam Sajidha Mohamed departed on Sunday evening for Tanzania to attend the 11th “Merck Foundation Africa Asia Luminary” Annual Conference. She will participate in the High-Level First Ladies Panel and deliver a keynote address, as well as speak at the Merck Foundation First Ladies Initiative (MFFLI) Committee Meeting.

The 11th Edition of the conference, taking place from October 29-30, 2024, brings together healthcare professionals, policymakers, and academics to discuss topics such as women’s empowerment, disease management, and expanding access to quality healthcare across Africa and Asia. The President's Office