Since late September, Morocco has witnessed a wave of protests not only in its major urban centers, such as Rabat, Casablanca and Marrakesh, but also in medium-sized towns and smaller municipalities across the country. Moroccan youth are leading this so-called Gen-Z 212 mobilization, a generational cohort of individuals born between 1997 and 2012, with the national telephone code +212 emphasizing their rootedness in the Moroccan context.  

This is a digitally-native, loosely coordinated and mostly peaceful youth collective that first emerged on September 18 via Discord, a messaging app that serves as the movement’s logistical and organizational hub. It rapidly gained traction through TikTok, and currently reports between 120,000 and 150,000 members, composed largely of students and young workers from working-class neighborhoods and mid-sized cities. Their participation reflects widespread frustration with limited economic and employment opportunities and structural inequalities that persist within the country. Despite Morocco’s image as a rising regional power, the Gen-Z 212 movement reveals it to be a nation still marked by deep socio-economic contradictions. 

Five-star stadiums, one-star hospitals 

Although initially peaceful in nature, the protests have escalated into violent clashes, with several fatalities and injuries reported. The unrest began in major cities before decentralizing toward regions such as Oujda, near the Algerian border, and Agadir, a coastal city that became a symbolic epicenter of national outrage following the deaths of eight women after cesarean procedures in a local hospital.  

What began as vigils and sit-ins quickly transformed into broader demonstrations across the country, fueled by public anger not only at health sector failures but also at perceived governmental misallocation of national priorities. In particular, criticism has been directed at the state’s significant investment in infrastructure for international sporting events – most notably the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations and the upcoming 2030 FIFA World Cup, cohosted by Morocco (along with Portugal and Spain).  

The government has allocated approximately 890 million euros to renovate six stadiums and an additional 469 million euros for the construction of a new stadium in Casablanca. Protest slogans such as “The stadiums are ready – but where are the hospitals?” encapsulate a broader demand for public service equity and redistribution. 

In analyzing this youth-led mobilization, observers have drawn parallels to Morocco’s own iteration of the Arab Spring, namely the “February 20 Movement” of 2011. That earlier protest wave – also youth-driven – eventually expanded to include political parties, trade unions and civil society actors, with demands centered on constitutional reforms and limitations on monarchical authority. It resulted in a new constitution and some reforms, but its momentum eventually declined. By contrast, Gen-Z 212 is non-partisan, decentralized and does not articulate explicit political or institutional demands. Its focus lies instead on social justice, equality of opportunity and universal access to essential public services, reflecting a shift from political contestation to socioeconomic grievance. 

Direct confrontation with state institutions 

Facing the current movement, authorities permitted public demonstrations on October 1, during which protests unfolded in a relatively peaceful manner. However, they intensified the following day, spreading across 13 cities and assuming a more confrontational and violent character. This escalation was evidenced by over 400 detentions in a four-day span and hundreds of injuries. The most tragic episode occurred in Lqliaa, a city of 80,000 near Agadir, where, on October 1, three individuals were killed as a result of intervention by security forces. 

Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch, leader of the liberal National Rally of Independents (RNI) and in office since 2021, is widely viewed as a symbol of Morocco’s rising economic oligarchy. According to Forbes, he ranks among Africa’s top 20 billionaires, with an estimated net worth of $1.6 billion. During the 2021 electoral campaign, he pledged the creation of 1 million jobs – a promise that he is struggling to fulfil in light of current socioeconomic realities. 

After the Lqilaa incident, the prime minister expressed regret for the casualties and injuries, affirming his willingness to engage in dialogue. He acknowledged the legitimacy of the youth movement’s demands, particularly in areas such as education, healthcare and the right to a dignified standard of living. Nevertheless, he emphasized the necessity of maintaining institutional protocols and public order.  

In response to his statements, the Gen-Z 212 movement bypassed the prime minister altogether, directly addressing King Mohammed VI in an open letter. It articulated eight explicit demands, including: the dissolution of the current government, the eradication of corrupt political parties, the initiation of impartial judicial proceedings against individuals involved in corruption and misappropriation of public funds, and the implementation of concrete structural reforms. 

The decision to appeal directly to the monarch – a figure who continues to enjoy widespread respect and who emerged unscathed from the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, unlike other Maghreb leaders – is a clear indicator of the prevailing atmosphere in the country. It signals a growing perception among younger generations that executive leadership and traditional political parties no longer serve as credible interlocutors for their concerns and interests. 

Protests as the tip of the iceberg 

The recent wave of demonstrations, while highly visible, is only the tip of the iceberg; just below the surface is a deeper and more systemic crisis. At the root of the unrest lie persistent failures in public health − the very sector where the protests initially began − and structural weaknesses in the national education system. Large segments of the population consider school quality to be severely lacking both in terms of geographical access and overall quality. 

Morocco’s social fabric is under strain. Youth unemployment has surged to a record 37 percent in 2025, with over 1.5 million individuals actively seeking work without success. This means that more than one-third of the country’s working-age youth are jobless – an alarming figure with serious implications for social stability and economic sustainability.  

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The employment crisis affects both university graduates and those lacking formally recognized or market-relevant qualifications. In response, the government launched several initiatives in 2024, including a $1.3 billion plan aimed at supporting private sector hiring and promoting rural development. It also increased the minimum wage by 5 percent, bringing it to approximately $300 per month in most sectors and slightly less in agriculture. However, this increase remains largely insufficient to meet the cost of living, particularly for those paying rent in urban areas. Labor market precarity remains a defining feature in Morocco: Only 6.5 percent of employed individuals hold permanent contracts, indicating widespread informal or unstable employment.  

These are not temporary or cyclical issues, but rather deeply entrenched structural problems. A key indicator of systemic distress is the steady rise in both internal and external migration, particularly among the youth. While Morocco continues to receive some inflows, emigration rates have consistently outpaced immigration. In 2010, an estimated 2.7 million Moroccans were living abroad; by 2020, that number rose to 3.3 million, and by 2024, it reached 3.6 million.  

The primary destinations remain France, Italy and Spain, though increasing numbers are relocating to North America. Recent data indicates that those who emigrate tend to possess higher educational levels than those who remain, with 33.5 percent of migrants having completed higher education.  

This selective migration of skilled professionals – the “brain drain” phenomenon observed in other Maghreb countries, such as Libya – significantly undermines the development potential of already fragile emerging economies. Compounding the issue is the growing mismatch between education and labor market needs, a disconnect increasingly emphasized by young Moroccans themselves. This is a domain where time is a critical factor – yet it appears the government is running out.