AW The Arab Weekly
 
US Senior Adviser for Arab and African Affairs Massad Fares Boulos speaks to the media, April 15, 2026.

WASHINGTON

Massad Boulos, Trump’s senior adviser, said Washington had taken note of Haroun’s arrest, while stressing the need to confront groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.

The US response to the reported arrest of Ahmed Haroun, a senior figure in former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s regime, goes beyond monitoring the fate of a man wanted over alleged atrocities against civilians. It touches on one of the most sensitive issues in Sudan’s war: the role of Islamists and networks linked to the former regime in shaping the country’s political and military landscape.

Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s senior adviser for Arab and African affairs, said Washington had taken note of Haroun’s arrest, while stressing the need to confront groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and networks of violent extremism. His remarks point to a broader US effort to include Islamist influence in the debate over the roots of Sudan’s war, rather than treating it solely as a conflict between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Washington increasingly views these networks not simply as political extensions of the former regime, but as actors it accuses of helping fuel the conflict and deepen civilian suffering. Boulos also recalled the US sanctions imposed on Haroun over his role in atrocities against Sudanese civilians.

Haroun held senior government and security positions, including minister of state at the Interior Ministry, and leadership roles in the National Congress Party (NCP), which ruled Sudan under Bashir. He is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, charges he denies.

His reported arrest has significance beyond his legal status. Haroun represents a political and security network built over three decades of Bashir’s rule. The war that erupted in April 2023 not only disrupted the balance of power between the army and the RSF, but also revived competition among forces seeking to shape the state and its institutions after the former regime’s fall.

US references to the Muslim Brotherhood carry added weight following Washington’s decision in March to designate Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation. The move marked a shift from political criticism and individual sanctions towards more stringent measures targeting organisations and networks associated with the movement.

The designation covered Sudan’s Islamic Movement and the al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade, which Washington accuses of participating in violence against civilians and undermining efforts to resolve the conflict. These are US allegations, not independent judicial findings against all those associated with Sudan’s Islamist current.

The central challenge lies in the relationship between these forces and the military establishment. Reports have pointed to the involvement of Islamist elements in supporting the army in its battles against the RSF, making efforts to dismantle their influence more complicated than pursuing former officials or removing party figures from public life. Their networks do not necessarily operate solely through formal political institutions, but may also extend into social, organisational and security circles.

Officials from the Islamic Movement have spoken of their members’ contribution to supporting the army’s advances against the RSF. Haroun himself said in a media interview two days before his reported arrest that the NCP and the army might not be politically aligned, but stood on the same side in confronting the RSF.

This means that the army leadership now faces a difficult equation. It needs to mobilise forces opposed to the RSF, but the presence of Islamists in its orbit raises questions about the military’s future relationship with groups associated with the former regime. This does not necessarily mean the army has adopted their entire agenda. It does, however, leave its leadership under domestic and international pressure to define the nature of these alliances and the extent of their influence over political and military decisions.

Haroun’s reported arrest may consequently carry two overlapping meanings: the pursuit of a figure wanted internationally and a possible recalibration of the army’s relationship with former regime leaders. But the suggestion that the military is seeking to distance itself from Islamists through his detention remains unconfirmed. The army has not publicly explained the reasons for his reported arrest, while the NCP and Haroun’s lawyers have linked the move to his recent media appearance and political criticism.

The circumstances surrounding the detention remain unclear. Two officials from the former ruling NCP told Reuters that the army had arrested Haroun. Defence lawyers also told the Associated Press that he had been taken into custody in Omdurman, near Khartoum. Sudanese authorities have not publicly explained the reasons for his detention or confirmed his whereabouts. On November 11, the Emergency Lawyers group said there was still no independent evidence or official confirmation that he was in custody and called on the authorities to clarify his status.

The ICC issued an arrest warrant against Haroun on April 27, 2007, accusing him of 42 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Darfur conflict in the early 2000s. The charges include murder, rape, torture, persecution and the forcible displacement of civilians. He has rejected the allegations as politically motivated. The court continues to list him as a fugitive, and proceedings cannot advance until he is transferred to The Hague.

Washington’s position places Islamist networks within its broader assessment of the roots of Sudan’s war, extending its focus beyond individual accountability. This could widen pressure on Sudanese parties if sanctions and terrorist designations develop into measures targeting sources of funding, movement and external relationships, rather than individual leaders alone.

The question is whether such pressure can become part of a political process that prevents networks associated with the former regime and Islamist groups from returning to centres of power without further complicating the military confrontation. Much will depend on the army leadership’s willingness to separate the demands of wartime mobilisation from the arrangements for governing Sudan after the conflict.

Boulos’s remarks signal that Washington wants Islamist influence included in any serious discussion about Sudan’s future. Ending the fighting remains an urgent priority, but a settlement that leaves these networks and their sources of political and military power unaddressed risks preserving some of the conditions driving the conflict, even if the guns fall silent temporarily.

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