Across several contemporary conflict theatres in Africa, a quiet but consequential challenge is shaping the effectiveness of national armies and multinational security missions. In operational environments such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR), military forces are increasingly exposed to a variety of imported tactical approaches delivered through multiple foreign training programmes.
On the surface, these partnerships strengthen capacity by introducing advanced equipment, modern planning procedures and specialized combat training. Yet beneath these benefits lies a structural risk that is gradually shaping battlefield outcomes in the erosion of a unified infantry doctrine within national armies.
In professional military terms, doctrine is the operational blueprint that governs how armed forces fight, coordinate and sustain operations. It defines manoeuvre warfare principles, command and control (C2) structures, combined arms integration, intelligence fusion and logistics sustainment across the battlefield.
Doctrine also standardises tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in military planning. This ensures that infantry battalions, Special Forces, Reconnaissance elements, Artillery, Armour, Signal, Engineers, intelligence, and logistics formations operate within the same operational framework integrated with air and naval capabilities.
When doctrine becomes fragmented or diluted by competing tactical systems, even highly trained units can struggle to achieve operational coherence. This dynamic is increasingly visible across several African conflict theatres where regional and international security assistance has expanded rapidly over the past decade.
In Somalia, the national security architecture has benefited from extensive international training partnerships aimed at strengthening the Somali National Army (SNA) and elite counterterrorism units. The US army has trained and equipped the Danab Advanced Infantry Brigade, a highly capable light infantry force designed for counterterrorism operations, direct action missions and precision targeting of insurgent militia networks of Al-Shabaab.
Turkey has established one of the largest overseas military training facilities in Mogadishu, where it trains regular Somali infantry brigades and officers within the SNA under a doctrine influenced by Turkish manoeuvre warfare and NATO operational concepts.
Other partners shaping Somalia’s security forces include the United Arab Emirates, which has supported training for Somali maritime security elements and specialised units tasked with infrastructure protection and rapid response operations. Eritrea has hosted Somali recruits for foundational infantry training programmes aimed at rebuilding the army’s manpower base. Uganda has trained infantry battalions and officers in counterinsurgency operations and peace support doctrine.
Further training support comes from Qatar, Ethiopia, Egypt, the United Kingdom and the European Union Training Mission in Somalia. They have played a significant role in officer development, staff planning capacity and operational headquarters functions. Kenya, given its operational proximity and shared security interests, has also provided training support to Somali infantry and border security units.
While these programmes have undoubtedly strengthened Somalia’s tactical capabilities, they also introduce diverse doctrinal influences. The Danab Brigade operates under a highly specialized counterterrorism doctrine aligned with US special operations methodologies, emphasising intelligence-driven targeting cycles and rapid strike capabilities.
Meanwhile, Turkish trained units operate under conventional manoeuvre doctrines designed to build a national army capable of territorial defence and stabilisation. When combined with training from other partners, the result can be a force where operational methodologies vary significantly across brigades.
A similar pattern is visible in the DRC, where international support has focused on strengthening the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) amid ongoing conflict in eastern provinces. International and regional partners including Kenya, France, Belgium, South Africa, Uganda and others have contributed to officer training, logistics development and operational coordination.
The multinational dimension is reinforced through peace support frameworks such as the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission (MONUSCO), which has supported training initiatives focused on command coordination, civilian protection doctrine and operational planning processes within FARDC structures.
The DRC is also currently involved in kinetic operations with the Ugandan and Burundian armies as well as other non-state armed actors on various fronts in the North Kivu and South Kivu and Ituri Provinces, which does have an impact on their combat doctrine at operationalisation level.
In the CAR, the training environment reflects another mix of international influence. Russia has played a prominent role in advising and training Central African Armed Forces units in combat readiness and operational deployment through the Wagner Group, now Africa Corps. Rwanda has supported infantry training and operational mentorship, while the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) has focused on institutional reform and professional military education.
The USA has contributed to planning, logistics, and leadership development programmes aimed at strengthening national defence capacity. Uganda too has opened its doors to training for CAR’s military officers within its borders on various combat-related and command.
On a case-by-case basis, each of these partnerships contributes valuable expertise and enhances the capabilities of the units involved. The challenge arises when multiple doctrinal influences converge within a single national army without a unifying doctrine that integrates them.
In such environments, formations may operate according to different mission planning cycles, communication protocols or engagement procedures. Commanders coordinating joint operations are forced to reconcile varying tactical approaches, complicating battlefield coordination thus slowing operational decision-making in line with their threat evaluation.
One often overlooked factor contributing to doctrinal fragmentation is differences in command philosophy and leadership culture introduced by foreign partners. Some military systems emphasise mission command that empowers junior leaders to take initiative on the battlefield, recognising the importance of Strategic Corporal Effect.
Others operate under more centralised command structures where decisions remain concentrated at headquarter-level. When officers trained under these different systems operate together, command expectations can diverge affecting operational tempo and battlefield synchronisation.
Another crucial dimension is the interoperability of communications and digital systems. Modern military operations rely heavily on integrated communication networks for coordination between units/formations/Services, intelligence dissemination and air ground integration. Multiple training programmes often introduce different radio systems, encryption protocols and digital reporting formats. Without standardised national communication architecture, even tactically capable units may struggle to coordinate effectively during complex operations.
Intelligence integration presents another strategic challenge. Different partners frequently introduce distinct intelligence processes and targeting methodologies. Special operations units may operate under rapid intelligence-driven targeting cycles with Freedom of Action (FOA), while conventional forces may follow structured operational planning processes. When these approaches are not integrated into a unified national intelligence architecture, critical information can become fragmented across command levels, leading to delayed decision-making and inconsistent threat assessments.
Logistics doctrine is equally decisive yet frequently overlooked in discussions about military reform as they are the key components in matters morale. Many externally trained units are equipped with systems that depend on specific supply chains, maintenance procedures or technical support frameworks tied to the training partner.
However, African operational theatres often involve vast distances, limited infrastructure and complex terrain. Without standardised logistics doctrine and sustainment systems, operational endurance becomes difficult to maintain across multiple formations.
At the strategic level, the alignment between national political leadership and military reform priorities plays a critical role in doctrinal cohesion. In some cases, security sector reform is influenced by donor priorities or regional alliances rather than long-term national defence planning. When doctrine development is not led by national institutions in line with the threats, external training partnerships may unintentionally shape the military according to their operational models instead of developing and reinforcing a country’s own defence strategy.
Institutional memory is another decisive factor. Many African militaries accumulate valuable operational experience through counterinsurgency campaigns, peacekeeping deployments, and regional security operations. However, without structured lessons learned systems and doctrine centres, these experiences are not consistently captured or translated into standardised training and policy. As a result, knowledge remains at the individual officer level rather than becoming institutional capability.
These challenges are further compounded by the realities of multinational security operations across the continent. Many African forces operate within regional or international frameworks such as the African Union Mission in Somalia, which require interoperability across multiple national contingents. When national doctrine is fragmented, integration into multinational command structures becomes more complex, potentially slowing operational planning and reducing the effectiveness of joint offensives.
Despite the increasing prominence of special operations forces and advanced military technology, infantry remains the decisive arm in stabilisation campaigns. Special Forces can conduct high-value target operations, disrupt insurgent networks and gather critical intelligence. However, it is conventional infantry units that hold ground, secure populations, protect supply routes and sustain operational presence in contested areas.
Unified infantry doctrine ensures that every Battalion, Brigade, Formation, Service and operational command functions within a common framework. It standardises battle drills, reporting formats, operational planning processes, and command relationships. More importantly, doctrine links tactical action with national strategic objectives, ensuring that operations contribute to long-term stabilisation rather than short-term tactical gains.
Developing such doctrine requires a structured military process. Professional Armed/Defence forces begin by assessing the strategic operating environment, analysing threats, terrain and geopolitical dynamics that influence conflict patterns. Intelligence assessments identify insurgent tactics, cross-border networks and emerging security risks. Military planners then integrate lessons learned from operational deployments through After Action Reviews (AAR) and operational debriefings conducted by field commanders.
These insights help identify effective tactics, techniques, and procedures that should be standardised across the force. From there, military leadership develops a Concept of Operations (CONOPs) outlining how the army will conduct campaigns ranging from counterinsurgency to border security. Doctrine development teams translate these operational concepts into formal manuals and training frameworks, which are then tested through Command Post Exercises (CP Ex), Field Training Exercises (FT Ex) and operational simulations.
Only after doctrine has been validated through realistic training scenarios should external training partnerships be fully integrated. When doctrine leads training, international partners reinforce a country’s operational framework rather than introducing competing systems. In such a model, Special Forces training enhances elite capabilities while remaining aligned with national infantry doctrine, ensuring that tactical specialisation strengthens rather than fragments the broader military structure.
The experience observed across Somalia, DRC and CAR highlights an emerging strategic lesson for many developing armed forces. Multi-partner training is not inherently problematic but can be a powerful force multiplier. However, without a strong doctrinal foundation, it risks creating operational fragmentation that undermines long-term military effectiveness.
Ultimately, the strength of an army lies not only in the skills of its elite units but in the unity of its operational doctrine. When every infantry battalion, reconnaissance unit, and logistics formation operates under the same strategic framework, military capability becomes sustainable, coordinated, and effective. In today’s complex security environment, doctrinal unity remains the decisive factor that transforms training into combat power and partnership into lasting security stability.
Written by Major Beautah Mwanza Suba, Kenya Defence Forces, Peace and Security Consultant, Specialist – Strategic Communications, Defence Diplomacy and Soft Power Doctrine; and Mugah Michael Sitawa PhD, Research Consultant – Central Africa Observatory on Organised Crime and Violence, Institute for Security Studies. Defence Web
