Ethiopia’s quest for Red Sea access

Prima facie, the deal seems to be a diplomatic success, fulfilling Ethiopia's long-standing need for immediate access to the sea. Ever since Eritrea’s independence, Djibouti, a port on the Red Sea, has served as Ethiopia's most important trade route. However, Djibouti charges Ethiopia about US$1.5 billion annually in port fees, prompting Ethiopia to explore other alternatives in neighbouring Eritrea, Sudan, Somaliland, and Kenya. The 2018 Peace Deal with Eritrea was greeted with optimism by Ethiopia as a move to reclaim duty-free access to Eritrean ports. There were also announcements with Somalia’s former President, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, for Ethiopia to jointly invest in four Somalian seaports. In August 2023, Ethiopian Minister for Transport and Logistics Alemu Sime visited Kenya's Lamu port too. However, Ethiopia’s plan to use any of these ports never materialised so far.

The 2018 Peace Deal with Eritrea was greeted with optimism by Ethiopia as a move to reclaim duty-free access to Eritrean ports.

As a matter of fact, Ethiopia has been eyeing Berbera and Port Sudan since 2005. However, Ethiopia was unable to carry out a complete transition from Djibouti due to several challenges, including logistical problems and the possibility of conflict with Somalia. Under an agreement with Emirates logistics management company, DP World, Ethiopia acquired a 19-percent stake in Berbera Port in 2018. At the time, Somalia denounced the deal as illegal. However, Ethiopia failed to meet its obligations and ultimately had to give up its share.

Everything changed in 2023 when Ethiopia's Prime Minister declared that his landlocked country must break the ‘geographic prison’ of approximately 120 million Ethiopians. He further explained that access to the Red Sea is an ‘existential issue’, linking it with demographic connections that go back to the 3^rd-century kingdom of Aksum. Although Abiy Ahmed refrained from mentioning war in his speech, his irredentist speeches supporting Ethiopia's territorial claims to Eritrea’s Red Sea ports raised concerns about the possibility of further conflict. Now that Ethiopia has managed to achieve its goal diplomatically, the possibility of another Ethiopia-Eritrea War in the short run may be ruled out.

Under an agreement with Emirates logistics management company, DP World, Ethiopia acquired a 19-percent stake in Berbera Port in 2018.

Nevertheless, this agreement is by no means a catalyst for peace in the region. Instead, the agreement has further increased the level of uncertainty in an already volatile region. Somalia called this an active violation of its sovereignty and recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia. Furthermore, on 6 January, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud signed a bill nullifying the agreement. The Somalian President also requested Ethiopia and Somaliland to withdraw the agreement. However, neither Somaliland nor Ethiopia is prepared to relinquish what has been called a historic pact.

Potential implications of the agreement

Somaliland is located in the northwestern part of Somalia, in the wider Horn of Africa region. In 1991, Somaliland gained its de facto independence after a bloody secessionist struggle which killed tens of thousands of people. In stark contrast to the civil war that continued to engulf neighbouring Somalia, relative stability persisted in Somaliland and it maintained a distinct identity for over 30 years. According to Freedom House, Kenya and Somaliland are the only countries in East Africa that are free in terms of political rights and civil liberties. Yet, Somaliland is not officially recognised by any country.

In fact, the often-overlooked region in the Horn of Africa gained international attention when Taiwan made the surprise announcement of its formal ties with Somaliland in 2020. Indeed, Somaliland is an important strategic asset for Ethiopia since it boasts of an 850-kilometre coastline located strategically on the Gulf of Aden. It is free from piracy problems and also covers the entrance to the Bab al-Mandeb, a chokepoint used by one-third of global trade. The often-overlooked region in the Horn of Africa gained international attention when Taiwan made the surprise announcement of its formal ties with Somaliland in 2020.

The agreement appears to be mutually beneficial. Under the agreement, Ethiopia will establish a military base and a commercial maritime zone and in exchange, will share military and intelligence information with Somaliland. The prevalence of terrorism and piracy has made the region vulnerable. Furthermore, Houthi rebels recently launched attacks on ships in the Red Sea in response to Israel's aggressive posture over the Gaza Strip. Given the strategic significance of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, this deal could also result in increased security in the Red Sea region.

Geopolitical tug-of-war over the Red Sea

The agreement will certainly benefit the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a major player in the Red Sea region with friendly ties to both Ethiopia and Somaliland. In 2016, Somaliland's government inked a 30-year concession agreement with Dubai-based port operator, DP World, to expand and modernise Berbera port. Additionally, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) is one of the principal funders for the Berbera Corridor, connecting Somaliland to the Ethiopian hinterland. The transformation of the Berbera Corridor into an economic hub has been hailed as a major economic turning point. The UAE was probably an influencer in favour of the agreement.

However, the agreement seems to be a geopolitical minefield, causing dissatisfaction among multiple stakeholders. First of all, the idea of an Ethiopian fleet stationed near its coast would be of great concern for Eritrea. Djibouti will also not be satisfied, as the deal would result in significant revenue losses. The agreement would likely annoy Saudi Arabia and Egypt as well because it could put the UAE ahead of them in the battle for control over the Red Sea.

China was already irked by the developments in the region, particularly from the proximity of Taiwan and Somaliland. Taiwan established its de facto embassy in Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa in August 2020, and Somaliland reciprocated with a representative office in Taipei the following month. According to a recent study by the American Enterprise Institute, the recent unrest in Somaliland's Las Anod region is China’s first proxy war in Africa. China has already appointed Xue Bing as the Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa and is expected to increase diplomatic pressure against the deal.

The agreement would likely annoy Saudi Arabia and Egypt as well because it could put the UAE ahead of them in the battle for control over the Red Sea.

Finally, this deal jeopardises diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, two countries with a protracted history of hostility and military confrontation. Ogaden, Ethiopia's Somali territory, was the site of a bloody conflict between the two countries from Somalia's independence in 1960 to the end of the Cold War. Although military intervention appears unlikely at this time, Somalia has appealed to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the larger international community for intervention.

In fact, in the wake of the agreement, the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), European Union (EU), Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Arab League have all urged Ethiopia to withdraw from the agreement and urged all parties to engage in constructive dialogue to resolve differences. Nonetheless, Ethiopia and Somaliland seem unfazed by the backlash and are determined to stick to the agreement.

An uncertain 2024 for the region

Landlocked Ethiopia’s Red Sea conundrum dates back to its 20-year border war with Eritrea. Despite a ceasefire in 2000, hostilities between the two nations persisted and Ethiopia could never use Massawa and Assab ports again. With this agreement, Ethiopia successfully managed to secure access to the sea and diversify its access to seaports. Although the details of the agreement will be finalised during follow-up meetings in the coming days, the declaration has already set the framework for this year’s bumpy interstate relations in the Horn of Africa.

Samir Bhattacharya is Senior Research Associate at Vivekananda International Foundation