The push for peace in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Cong (DRC) following the fall of Goma and Bukavu to the M23 rebels in February saw East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) states call for joint Ministerial and Heads of States and Governments Summits. This was closely followed by the Defence technical Experts’ meeting of the various member states.
One of the proposals during the meeting called for the EAC-SADC efforts to ‘address all residual issues relating to the attainment of Peace and Security’. The plans were somewhat overtaken by diplomatic manoeuvres of the United States of America and Qatar as they took the lead in the pursuit for lasting peace in the Eastern part of the DRC and stability in the mineral-rich Central African state.
In as much as there has been significant movement in the corridors of diplomacy, calling for cessation of hostilities, fighting persists between pro-Kinshasa groups and the M23 as the main armed group involved in the conflict. All indications of both sides bracing for protracted kinetics are pronounced as both parties continue to arm and engage in combat.
Efforts to enforce a ceasefire failed as the Wazalendo stepped up to plug the void left by FARDC at various battle fronts. The patriots, composed of a coalition of Mai Mai groups hold Uvira’s defence lines where generals such as Delphin ‘Ngoma Nzito’, Albert Kahasha ‘Foka Mike’ and Yakutumba have been rallying their charges under the mantra la patrie ou la mort (our homeland or death).
With these realities unfolding, there is a high likelihood that the Washington and Doha peace accords are bound to join the long list of agreements that have delivered peace on paper only.
According to Dr Paul Simon Handy – Regional Director Institute for Security Studies-East Africa and Representative to the AU – in his publication titled, ‘Diplomacy without deterrence won’t bring peace in eastern DRC’, he cites the lack of any credible military force to compel M23 withdrawal, verify withdrawal and protect civilians.
The US and Qatar should consider an African-led ‘boots on the ground’ approach comprised of EAC and SADC states as the deployment of the military of the US and Qatar may not be the best option due to various issues including cultural disparities such as language and religion. In as much as US and Qatar possess the strategic lift capabilities, it would be more cost effective to rely on the bases of EAC-SADC troop contributing countries (TCCs) that are in closer range to the DRC.
The mandate of establishment of the EAC-SADC mission should consider military, police and civilian components. The mandate should preferably be a two-year term, renewable thereafter for a two-year term (once) and subsequent one-year terms. In as much as it may be perceived as infringing on Congolese sovereignty, termination of the mandate of the mission should be subjected to the EAC-SADC Heads of States, informed by reports of the joint verification mechanisms. This is as opposed to the previous arrangement whereby Kinshasa reserved the right on the issue.
The mission formed should adopt a non-kinetic/non-offensive interventionist approach geared towards establishment of a securitized buffer zone, with areas of responsibility occupied by FARDC, SADC, EAC forces laid out West to Eastwards. A Joint Verification Mechanisms should be formed and access to all AORs with representatives from the DRC Ministry of Defence, ICGLR, MONUSCO, US and Qatar, and the regional bodies. Kinshasa should consider suspending all other bilateral military agreements in the areas of responsibility that the force will be deploying, to avoid any conflicts of interest.
To support the ease of movement, the planned construction works of Kasindi to Beni (under operation Shujaa), Beni-Butembo integration, and the Bunagana-Goma that run 80, 54 and 89 kilometres stretches respectively should be fast-tracked.
Urgent restoration and construction of infrastructure critical to administration of justice and rule of law under Military Assistance to Civilian Authority (MACA) is imperative, targeting police posts, court rooms and correction institutions.
This should be accompanied by recruitment and/or training of necessary personnel to the required standards, a role best carried out police and civilian components that should make part of the mission. The function should be carried out in tandem with the National Police and the Judiciary.
The resumption of a military assistance training programme such as the Kenya Military Assistance Training Programme (KMAT) that was ongoing in Kisangani is integral, for purposes of building a self-reliant and disciplined force. The same programme should look into military reforms that will handle issues of troop welfare. EAC and SADC member states should equally support capacity building of FARDC top leadership through mentorship programmes and various professional courses with a transfer of technology component to it for purposes of sustainability.
To boost border defence capabilities, Kinshasa should consider establishment of strategic military bases, with air force and aerial surveillance capabilities in Bunagana and Kamanyola. Patrol the waters of shared water bodies to the East is critical thus, establishment of military capabilities on Lake Kivu (on Idjwi Island) and Lake Albert (between Apala and Kasenyi) would be a worthy security investment. A long-term plan to establish and/or enhance defence capabilities along the remaining six frontiers as the above plan will cater for frontier defences on DRC’s Eastern flanks.
Capacity building for civil society actors should be carried out to orient/appraise them on the concept of operations (CONOPs) as well as empower them on matters mis/dis-information, and information verification.
Community leadership should be capacity built on ethnic tolerance and co-existence, specifically focussing on communities that neighbour the Congolese Tutsi in the North Kivu and the Banyamulenge in South Kivu.
Strengthening the civil service of the DRC is critical. Provision of training in areas of administration, revenue collection among other key government functions is key.
A multi-sectoral investment strategy should be rolled out in the Eastern DRC, pulling investment from public and private sector from US, Qatar and the two RECs. This is critical to provision of employment for the region as well as increase the need to prioritize stability.
For this strategy to sail through, the US and Qatar may consider engaging diplomatic back-channels and convince Kinshasa to invite the force. This is in view of the challenge that DRC considers the EAC forces as pro-M23. It has got to be put across that any forms of cordial engagements between the leadership between the EACRF and the M23 were essential for negotiation as they saw the M23 cede territories such as Kitchanga, Kiwanja, Rumangabo as well as grant the East African forces the latitude to create a buffer zone. Further, it was only through the cordial relationship that M23 were open to the cantonment debate-all without dispensing a single round.
In view of the fact that the DRC remains suspicious of the East Africa Community, Washington and Doha may need to prevail upon the member states to dissociate themselves from any direct and indirect political and military activities that may be seen as fuelling conflict in the Eastern DRC. In the case of Rwanda, direct military support of the M23 should cease. Uganda’s General Muhozi should desist from taking sides with the M23 through his posts on X. Nairobi too should consider steer clear from hosting anti-Kinshasa political coalitions such as the Congo River Alliance, as well as hosting opposition meetings. The nations should take note of this type of dissociation as having been effectively applied by Ethiopia and Senegal.
The Tshisekedi regime stands to benefit from the EAC-SADC deployment as it would facilitate bank and airport reopening. This would ease the suffering of the populations in Bukavu and Goma. Commencement of capacity-building FARDC would equally address the concerns of a possible coup and assassination by pro-opposition generals.
Before deployment of the EAC-SADC forces though, national dialogue initiated by Kinshasa involving all political and religious actors is critical. The DRC faces a serious rift between the Swahiliphones of the East (branded as pro-Rwanda) and those of the West (considered pro-Kinshasa and ‘pure’ Congolese). Equally, the relationship between communities such as the Banyamulenge, and the Congolese Tutsi remain tense.
Written by Mugah Michael Sitawa (PhD), Researcher – Central Africa Observatory on Organised Crime and Violence Project and Major (Rtd) Beutah Mwanza Suba, Peace and Security Consultant. Defence Web
