South Sudan is currently bogged down over the definition of the state. There is a debate that South Sudan is the Dinka State due to power, control, and the politics of exclusion, in which Dinka leaders are at the centre of the debate. The strategic positions that Dinka personalities find themselves in, as they are at the heart of decision-making in the government, support this claim.

The claim that the government is “Dinka-dominated” arises from a pattern of activities in the course of running the government, not just a single appointment. Critics point to the systematic concentration of individuals from the Dinka Community, particularly from the Bahr el Ghazal region, who are in decisive state institutions, including:

• The presidency and executive core
• The military and organized forces
• Intelligence and internal security
• Revenue-generating institutions
• Petroleum (the backbone of the economy)

This concentration is seen as structural rather than incidental, because it appears across multiple sectors simultaneously, especially those that control coercive force and financial flows.

The presidency and executive core

At the apex of power is Salva Kiir Mayardit, from the Dinka Community of Bahr el Ghazal. Around him are:

• Key presidential advisors and security decision-makers who are overwhelmingly from the same ethnic and regional background.
• Senior ministers in defense, interior, finance, justice, and information. These and other most strategic portfolios are largely held by Dinka officials.

While the government is formally a coalition under the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), critics argue that real decision-making authority remains concentrated within a narrow inner circle solely made up of Dinka.

Security sector dominance

a) Military (SSPDF)

The South Sudan People’s Defence Forces is widely viewed as the backbone of political power, and:

• Commander-in-Chief: the President (Dinka)
• Chief of Defence Forces and key deputies: predominantly Dinka
• Elite units such as the Presidential Guard (Tiger Division): commanded by Dinka officers

This concentration matters because in fragile states, control of the military equals control of the state.

b) National Security Service (NSS)

The Internal Security Bureau, one of the most powerful intelligence organs, is led by Gen. Akec Tong Aleu and his Deputy (Dinka)

The NSS has broad authority over arrest without warrant, indefinite detention, surveillance, and political control, making its leadership composition highly consequential.

c) Police, Prisons, and Interior

Under the Ministry of Interior:

• Inspector General of Police: Dinka
• Director General of Prisons: Dinka
• Wildlife (paramilitary) leadership: Dinka

This creates what critics call “vertical dominance”, from ministerial level down to operational command.

Control of Economic Arteries

a) Petroleum Sector

Oil accounts for over 90 percent of government revenue. In this sector:

• Current ministry leadership and undersecretaries: Dinka
• Nilepet (state oil company): Dinka-led
• Key operational roles in joint oil companies: Dinka

Control of oil translates into control of state financing, patronage networks, and international contracts.

b) Revenue Authority

At the South Sudan Revenue Authority, the Commissioner General, deputies, and key commissioners are predominantly Dinka

This institution controls taxation, customs, and non-oil revenue, reinforcing perceptions that financial inflows are centrally controlled by one group.

Administrative and bureaucratic penetration

Beyond ministers, critics emphasize mid- to high-level bureaucracy:

• Undersecretaries across ministries (petroleum, electricity, ICT, labor, etc.)
• Director Generals in aviation, petroleum authorities, and statistics
• Leadership in public universities and national agencies

This suggests not just political leadership dominance, but institutional embedding across the state apparatus.

Judiciary and legal architecture

The judiciary, led by Chief Justice Dr. Benjamin Baak Deng Bol, has also witnessed promotions of multiple Dinka judges to appellate and high court levels. Critics argue that influence over the judiciary affects:

• Constitutional interpretation
• Electoral disputes
• Accountability mechanisms

7. Immigration, passports, and border control

Even in areas where top leadership is not exclusively Dinka (e.g., immigration), senior operational influence remains significant through deputy and advisory roles and security-linked oversight positions.

This reinforces the perception of indirect control even where formal leadership is diverse.

Why “Bahr el Ghazal Government”?

The more specific label, “Bahr el Ghazal government”, emerges because:

• A significant proportion of these Dinka officials originates from the Bahr el Ghazal region, the president’s political base
• Key security and political alliances are historically rooted in that region
• No appointments at any level of government can be made without the approval of the Dinka leaders from Bahr El Ghazal, and the appointees must execute the will of Bahr El Ghazal.

Thus, critics see not just ethnic concentration, but regional consolidation within that ethnicity.

Counterpoint: Formal power-sharing vs. actual power

It is important to maintain analytical balance:

• The RTGoNU includes representatives from multiple ethnic and political groups (e.g., SPLM-IO, other parties)
• Some non-Dinka figures hold visible positions (including vice presidents and ministers)

However, critics argue that formal inclusion does not necessarily equal substantive power, especially if control of security forces and finances is centralized elsewhere or by one community.

Conclusion: Structural perception, not just rhetoric

The central problem is not merely who holds office, but how power is organized and exercised. When authority is concentrated in a narrow political-security network, institutions lose autonomy, accountability weakens, and public trust erodes. It is this reason that the label “Dinka government” persists due to three factors, namely:

1. Control of coercive institutions (army, NSS, police)
2. Control of financial systems (oil, revenue authority)
3. Reinforcement through bureaucratic and judicial appointments

Therefore, what is required to correct this kind of system is not just cosmetic reshuffling, but a systemic overhaul that redefines the rules of governance. Without this, the perception of the Dinka Government will not fade away, whether fully accurate or politically contested, as long as the state of South Sudan continues to have power heavily centralized within one ethnic and regional network.

In order to overturn this system, South Sudan needs radical, rules-based reforms that insulate key institutions from political and tribal capture, especially in the security sector, revenue administration, the judiciary, and natural resource management. This means establishing merit-based appointments, transparent oversight mechanisms, enforceable term limits, and genuine separation of powers.

Independent commissions must be empowered to audit, investigate, and regulate without interference, while the armed forces and intelligence services must be professional and subordinated to constitutional, not personal, authority. A stable future depends on transforming the state from a vehicle of control into a framework of law.

Only strong, independent institutions, trusted across communities. can replace cycles of dominance with a durable, inclusive national order. Without such structural reform, the crisis will persist; with it, the foundation for legitimacy, unity, and long-term stability can finally emerge.

The Writer, Hon. Juol Nhomngek Daniel, is a constitutional lawyer. He serves as a lecturer in Constitutional and Human Rights Law, a researcher, and is the Deputy Dean of the College of Law at Starford International University.

The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the author’s responsibility, not Radio Tamazuj’s.